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Passive Discrimination:
When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?
Jonah Gelbach,† Jonathan Klick,†† & Lesley Wexler‡
Economists have long recognized employers’ ability to construct benefits packages
to induce workers to sort themselves into and out of jobs. For instance, to encourage applications from individuals with a highly valued but largely unobservable characteristic, such
as patience, employers might offer benefits that patient individuals are likely to value more
than other individuals. By offering a compensation package with highly valued benefits
but a relatively low wage, employers will attract workers with the favored characteristic
and discourage other individuals from applying for or accepting the job. While economic
theory generally views this kind of self-selection in value neutral terms, prejudiced employers could exploit this mechanism to systematically discourage individuals on the basis
of observable characteristics that the law prohibits employers from considering in their
hiring decisions. As long as groups systematically differ in their preferences for various
employment terms and conditions, employers can generate sorting in the application and
employment acceptance stages, leading to the desired segregated outcome in a way that
regulators will find difficult to prevent without dictating uniformity in benefits packages.
We develop a formal model as well as an intuitive discussion of this phenomenon.
We provide a number of representative illustrations of how a prejudiced employer could
exploit preference heterogeneity for discriminatory ends. These mechanisms include wage
and benefit packages such as (1) high pension, low wages; (2) commission-based salaries;
(3) Sundays-off policies; and (4) free school tuition. We also note that some employers
might end up with a segregated workforce even when they have no intention to sort
workers or when they intend to sort for a nondiscriminatory characteristic.
Finally, we conclude that current federal antidiscrimination law inadequately addresses either intentional or unintentional passive discrimination. Neither disparate
treatment nor disparate impact frameworks are well suited to grappling with this form
of structural discrimination. Passive discrimination facilitates rather than impedes employee choice and thus might not be viewed as discrimination per se, even if it results in
workplace segregation or means that individuals with protected characteristics who fail
to self sort are least likely to value the form of compensation and fringe benefits they
receive. We finish with a discussion of some judicial and legislative approaches that may
ameliorate passive discrimination.

† Associate Professor of Economics, University of Arizona.
†† Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
‡ Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
Many thanks to Curtis Bridgeman, Fred Gedicks, Steve Gey, Mike Zimmer, participants at
the 2008 Midwest Law and Economics Association annual meeting, and participants in the
Second Annual Labor and Employment Law Colloquium for comments.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Since the seminal contributions of Gary Becker, scholars have
generated a huge theoretical and empirical law and economics litera2
ture around the topic of employment discrimination. In that litera3
4
5
ture, scholars examine discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
6
and a host of other characteristics. Further, researchers develop and
7
investigate models in which discrimination springs from employer,
8
9
coworker, and customer animus, as well as discrimination that is not
generated by animus at all, but through a type of Bayesian inference
10
referred to as statistical or rational discrimination.
These models and empirical investigations center on the employment policies and practices known in the legal context as the disparate

1
Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination 122 (Chicago 1957) (developing a framework for analyzing workplace discrimination in such a manner that yields quantifiable data and
the opportunity for empirical research).
2
For a review of this literature, see John J. Donohue, The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law, in A.M. Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Economics 1387–1467
(North-Holland 2007).
3
See, for example, John J. Donohue and James J. Heckman, Continuous versus Episodic
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J Econ Lit 1603,
1640 (1991) (evaluating several theories for the economic progress of blacks after 1964).
4
See, for example, Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws,
56 U Chi L Rev 1311, 1334 (1989) (suggesting that sex discrimination laws may have reduced
women’s aggregate welfare); John J. Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace:
An Economic Perspective, 56 U Chi L Rev 1337, 1366 (1989) (arguing that sex discrimination
laws can improve workplace efficiency and are necessary to change employer behavior).
5
See, for example, Vani K. Borooah, Is There a Penalty to Being a Catholic in Northern
Ireland: An Econometric Analysis of the Relationship between Religious Belief and Occupational
Success, 15 Eur J Pol Econ 163, 188 (1999) (suggesting that the overrepresentation of Catholics
in the jobless population reflects systematic religious discrimination).
6
See, for example, Christine Jolls, Identifying the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act Using State-law Variation: Preliminary Evidence on Educational Participation Effects, 94 Am
Econ Rev 447, 448 (2004) (comparing changes in educational participation by individuals with
disabilities across states with differing pre-ADA regimes).
7
See, for example, Becker, Economics of Discrimination at 31 (cited in note 1) (creating a
model that accounts for employers’ tastes and market forces in order to measure employer discrimination against employees); Dan A. Black, Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model, 13 J
Labor Econ 309, 327 (1995) (predicting that minority workers as a group will receive lower
wages if any fraction of employers harbors distaste for that group).
8
See, for example, Barry R. Chiswick, Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: A Test
of Alternate Hypotheses, 81 J Polit Econ 1330, 1346 (1973) (presenting evidence that race-based
preferences for coworkers lead to income inequality).
9
See, for example, George J. Borjas and Steven G. Bronars, Consumer Discrimination and
Self-employment, 97 J Polit Econ 581, 604 (1989) (arguing that white consumers’ discriminatory
preferences lead to lower incomes for self-employed minorities).
10 See, for example, Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am
Econ Rev 659, 661 (1972) (postulating that background assumptions about minority employees’
capabilities influence the interpretation of objective performance metrics).
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treatment of or the disparate impact on individuals in protected classes.
Regulators and courts tend to frame their inquiries around whether an
employer directly and intentionally treats employees from a disfavored
group differently or whether the employer imposes job requirements
that are unnecessary for the performance of the job but have the effect,
12
intended or not, of disadvantaging individuals in a disfavored group.
In this Article, we present a distinct mechanism of employer discrimination largely ignored by scholars and regulators alike. What we
term “passive discrimination” involves the employer’s use of wage and
benefits packages that exploit observed, systematic group-level preference heterogeneity to induce workers to sort themselves ex ante such
that members of a disfavored group view the job opportunity as being
less attractive than do members of other groups.
By way of illustration, imagine a setting in which individuals from
two groups, Deltas and Omegas, comprise the labor pool from which employees may be hired. While the work productivity of Deltas and Omegas
is drawn from the same distribution (that is, the expected productivity of
members from each group is equal), a given employer dislikes Omegas
for reasons unrelated to their job qualifications. Because Omegas have
suffered discrimination historically, legislation designates Omegas as a
protected class for employment purposes. Further, while both Deltas and
13
Omegas have similar reservation wages, Deltas, on average, more highly
value some nontransferable good that the employer can procure (or
produce) at a cost equal to or lower than the Deltas’ average valuation
of the good. To make the illustration more concrete, assume the employer is a brewery and offers free beer at lunchtime.
While the employer prefers to hire only Deltas, regulators and
courts could easily observe such behavior and impose legal penalties as
well as order the employer to hire Omegas. Because Deltas and Omegas, by assumption, possess equal abilities in terms of job requirements,
the employer cannot justify differential hiring decisions based on the
claim that Omegas fail to meet a relevant job requirement. Lastly, if the
employer attempts to conceal the job’s availability from Omegas by
advertising it only in Delta neighborhoods or through Delta social networks, regulators are likely to discover such a plan and may require the
employer to advertise more broadly.

11

See John J. Donohue, Foundations of Employment Discrimination Law 193 (Foundation

2003).
12

See, for example, Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 432 (1970) (“Congress directed
the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment discrimination, not simply the motivation.”); EEOC Compliance Manual § 604.1 at 2093 (CCH 1999).
13 Reservation wages are the lowest wage at which an individual is willing to accept a job.
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In our setting, employers may advertise the job broadly and make
hiring decisions in a seemingly nondiscriminatory fashion, avoiding lawsuits and penalties from the regulator, and still achieve an ultimate workforce that is predominantly (if not exclusively) composed of Deltas.
Specifically, if the employer offers a compensation package composed
of a submarket wage as well as access to the free beer at lunchtime,
Omegas will find such a job unattractive as they do not value the beer
enough to compensate them for the lower wage, while Deltas will still
gladly accept the job offers. If the employment regulators note the absence of Omegas in the firm’s employment, the brewery can easily produce documentation that it advertised broadly, generated an applicant
pool that approximates the relevant labor pool, and offered employment to both Deltas and Omegas at a nondiscriminatory rate.
Ultimately, according to the firm, due to no misconduct on its part,
Omegas simply lacked interest in working for the brewery. By engaging
in passive discrimination of this sort, the employer avoids hiring individuals from the disfavored group without generating regulatory backlash or successful civil litigation.
While scholars who write in the area of discrimination law have
tangentially touched on this phenomenon in some isolated contexts,
14
such as discussions of workplace dress codes or the disproportionate
15
burden placed on women by jobs requiring extensive travel, no one
16
has examined these practices in a systematic way. Such discrimination
is not generally presented as an avenue for intentional discrimination,
but rather as an ancillary effect of employment policies or conditions.
When looking at these practices, scholars tend to suggest that either
employment discrimination law should be readjusted to better grapple
17
with structural and nonintentional work conditions, or such practices,
14 See, for example, Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich L Rev 2541, 2544 (1994) (arguing that judicial reliance on community norms of workplace dress and appearance legitimates
the gender stereotypes that Title VII was enacted to eliminate).
15 See, for example, Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination
Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34
Mich J L Ref 371, 413–14 (2001).
16 Many have discussed practices that implicate the work-life balance, which may operate
to screen out many women from particular jobs. We consider strategies such as the use of long
hours and high wages, or substantial face time and high wages, to be special cases, as they more
directly implicate productivity than the hypotheticals we present. As we explain in Part I, for
purposes of disproving Gary Becker’s theory, we presume all workers are equally productive.
Cases that integrate productivity are important and doctrinally interesting, but we focus on the
simplest examples in this Article and leave more complex cases for later works.
17 See, for example, Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv CR–CL L Rev 91, 105 (2003) (arguing that
reorganization of the workplace into a less hierarchical model has allowed discriminatory bias to
enter in such a manner that current Title VII doctrine would not remedy).
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while lamentable, are potentially justified on nondiscriminatory
18
grounds. Yet recent class actions suggest that much of legal academia
and the public underestimate the prevalence of basic animus- or stereo19
type-driven discrimination. So it should be unsurprising if litigationsavvy employers might deliberately craft compensation structures and
packages to exclude certain types of workers.
Lior Strahilevitz’s work on using neighborhood amenities to induce segregation in housing communities is a notable exception to the
scholarly blinders to the possible relationship between self-sorting and
20
deliberately induced segregation. The intuition motivating his work is
similar to the one we exploit here. Strahilevitz argues that because antidiscrimination laws prohibit developers from directly marketing new
21
neighborhoods to buyers from favored demographic groups, developers instead “embed” costly amenities such as golf courses that tend to
be little valued by potential residents from disfavored demographic
groups. By requiring all residents to pay for these amenities, members
of the disfavored group will generally choose not to live in such communities. Because of this likely choice, individuals from favored groups
can then treat the existence of these “exclusionary amenities” as both a
signal of the neighborhood’s demographic make-up and an implicit
commitment that the community will maintain that make-up. These
amenities essentially enable the developer to segregate the community
by inducing the individuals from undesirable groups to self-select away
from the community without running afoul of fair housing laws or other
22
local regulations that prohibit discrimination. By exploiting observable
group-level preference heterogeneity, the developers can passively
achieve segregation whereas they would be punished if they overtly
attempted to discriminate to achieve the same ends.
In this Article, we begin by presenting a formal model of passive
discrimination in which an employer offers a compensation package
composed of a below-market cash wage plus some nontransferable
benefit that is valued less highly by individuals from the disfavored
group. The formal model highlights the conditions under which a sepa18 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case against Employment
Discrimination Laws 290–312 (Harvard 1995).
19 Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the
Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 Emp Rts & Emp Policy J 1, 30–32 (2005) (contrasting
the rise of major class action sex discrimination cases against the dominant perception that
workplace sex discrimination has largely receded over the last thirty years).
20 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va L Rev 437 (2006).
21 The law also limits the extent to which developers can provide information regarding
the demographic makeup of the existing residential population. See id at 444 n 18.
22 Id at 437.
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rating or segregating equilibrium will be achieved. It also shows,
however, that in the resulting equilibrium, individuals from the disfavored group need not be “harmed” in terms of ultimate economic well24
being. Therefore, this sort of equilibrium is not generally subject to
Becker’s conclusion that competition will force out employer tastebased discrimination in the labor market. We then provide some realworld illustrations of group-level preference heterogeneity that could
generate passive discrimination in various occupational settings. We
also note examples where the exploitation of preference heterogeneity may generate normatively attractive worker sorting.
We next discuss when current antidiscrimination law applies to
this kind of passive discrimination. We note that some employers hold
a discriminatory intent when designing such terms and conditions,
while others might be simply unaware or neutral as to when their design of such packages will induce segregation based on membership in
a disfavored group. Part III notes doctrinal limits in the context of
compensation packages as well as how the passive discrimination setting might magnify some of Title VII’s more general limitations. We
conclude with a discussion of how regulators and courts might address
passive discrimination.
I. A FORMAL MODEL OF PASSIVE DISCRIMINATION
In this Part, we present a very basic, one-period microeconomic
model in which equilibrium occurs in both perfectly competitive labor
and goods markets. Because all hypothesized workers are equally
productive, and because no market power exists and no state mandate
23 For those unconvinced in the first instance that competition will force out employer
taste-based discrimination or for those interested in relaxing some of the assumptions of perfect
competition, such passive discrimination presents a different harm. If an employer attempts to
create a segregating equilibrium and does not entirely succeed, the employees he attempted but
failed to screen out may experience economic harm vis-à-vis other employees. Many, though not
necessarily all, individuals within the disfavored group will receive a compensation package that
is of less perceived or actual value to them than to the other employees.
24 Individuals from the disfavored groups who self-sort out of the job, as well as those from
the favored groups who self-sort into the job, do, however, experience many harms associated
with segregation itself. This harm is less straightforward than the harms associated with residential segregation, such as the exclusion from valuable social networks. But integrated workplaces
may provide welfare values to all involved by decreasing stigma and eradicating misperceptions
among groups. In other words, those who participate in an integrated workforce benefit by lessening the effects of irrational or incorrect stereotypes.
In addition, much evidence suggests that those from protected groups, such as women, seek
integrated and diverse workplaces as a proxy for a nondiscriminatory environment. This point is
articulated in Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with
Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27
Harv Women’s L J 1, 88 (2004). Even workers who economically gain from segregation may have
a preference for fairness or diversity that is unsatisfied by a segregated equilibrium.
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supports segregation, models like this one typically cannot sustain a
deliberately segregated equilibrium. In order to maintain segregation,
prejudiced firms would have to pay a premium to favored workers to
be sure of attracting them. However, any firm that did so would have
higher costs of production than nonprejudiced firms. These higher
costs would render prejudiced firms uncompetitive, and in a model of
perfect competition, these firms would necessarily go out of business.
Thus, employers could not sustain deliberate discrimination against
disfavored groups in equilibrium. However, when workers’ preferences for an amenity good are correlated with worker types, segregated equilibria are possible, and possibly even unique. Prejudiced
firms can use compensation plans that combine cash wages and fringe
benefits in an effort to hire only the favored types of workers.
We first discuss some basic background details of the model in
Part I.A.1, focusing on the production technology, competitive labor
and goods markets, and the (assumed) systematic differences in preferences of two worker types: Deltas and Omegas. We then derive the
optimal consumption bundles of Deltas and Omegas. Deltas consume
both a generic good and amenities, while Omegas choose to consume
only the generic good. In Part I.A.2, we then consider the labor market equilibrium when all labor market compensation must be paid in
cash, so that fringe benefits are not allowed. The resulting equilibrium
is integrated in the sense that no firm can be sure of sustaining a deliberately discriminatory hiring-and-compensation policy.
Finally, in Part I.A.3, we introduce the possibility of compensation
plans that involve both cash wages and fringe benefits, considering first
the case where firms face the same amenity price as do their workers. In
such cases, a no-fringe-benefits equilibrium exists. As above, this equilibrium is integrated. However, at least one cash-and-fringe compensa25
tion plan allows prejudiced firms to hire only Deltas in equilibrium.
The resulting equilibrium is segregated, in the sense that at least some
firms may (1) deliberately avoid hiring Omegas, and (2) stay in business.
Interestingly, the Omegas’ utility is no lower in this equilibrium than it
would be in the cash-wage-only equilibrium. This result follows because
of the competitive nature of the labor market, which ensures that oth26
er firms will hire Omegas and pay them their marginal product. We
emphasize this point to highlight how it diverges from standard results
suggesting that employer taste-based discrimination is not possible in
equilibrium in competitive markets. While Omegas may suffer no
25

Typically, an infinite number of compensation plans exist.
If workers are bothered by participating in an economy with a segregated workforce, then
their overall welfare will be reduced in any segregated equilibrium. Where this fact is relevant, we will
note it. However, the equilibria themselves do not depend on the existence of such a phenomenon.
26
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harm in terms of their valuation of their compensation terms, a social
and/or individual cost to segregation may exist independent of utility
as measured by the consumption of goods and leisure only.
We also consider the case where firms have a price advantage in
purchasing amenities, perhaps because of economies of scale. In this
case, no integrated equilibrium exists. Any equilibrium necessarily involves cash-and-fringe compensation plans used to pay Deltas and a
cash-only plan used to pay Omegas. Banning fringe benefits would
(1) eliminate segregation, (2) reduce Deltas’ utility compared to the
segregated equilibrium, and (3) have no impact on the Omegas’ utility
compared to the segregated equilibrium. We note that this condition for
equilibrium would hold even when employers harbor no animus toward
Omegas. These results occur because forcing firms to use only cash
wages prevents Deltas from negotiating discounted amenities without
providing any countervailing benefit to Omegas. As above, though, if
discrimination is regarded as socially or individually harmful in ways
that do not show up in consumption-based utility, then Omegas, as well
as Deltas, may well be worse off under a segregated equilibrium.
A. Model Details
Suppose two types of workers, Deltas (signified by ǻ) and Omegas (signified by ȍ) exist. Every member of each group is identical to
all other members of that group in terms of tastes. Preferences for
Deltas and Omegas are given by
Uǻ = xĮb Į – c × W
1-

(1)

Uȍ = x – c × W,

(2)

where x is the number of units of a generic consumption good a person consumes, b is the number of units of an amenity good (mnemonically, think of this good as “beer”), c is the disutility of working, W
equals one if the person works for pay and zero otherwise, and Į is a
27
preference parameter for Deltas and lies between zero and one.
We assume that all jobs in the economy involve the same type of
labor, all workers have one unit of labor to offer, and all workers are
equally productive. Firms can hire as many workers as they like. If

27 The function f(x, b) = xĮb1-Į is an example of a type of preferences known as CobbDouglas. This form is standard to assume for preferences, because it leads to the result that the
consumer spends the fraction Į of her income on good x and the rest on good b. See Andreu
Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 55 (Oxford 1995)
(explaining the use of the Cobb-Douglas utility function in deriving a consumer’s optimal consumption bundle of commodities). Nothing important about our results hinges on assuming this
type of preferences; we do so for expositional ease.
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hired by a firm, each worker can produce Q units of the generic good
with her one unit of labor. We normalize the price of a unit of the ge28
neric consumption good to be one, and we assume that the price of
the amenity good is fixed at level pb.
1. Optimal consumption and labor supply decisions.
Let Yǻ be the income a Delta worker receives if she works for pay;
assuming for simplicity that she has zero income otherwise, her income
equals W × Yǻ. Her utility-maximizing choice of consumption in terms
of x and b will then be given by whatever choice of (x, b) maximizes
Uǻ subject to the constraint that
x + pb × b = W × Yǻ.

(3)

Equation (3) is known as the budget constraint—in this case for
Deltas. Each unit of x costs one unit of income, and each unit of b
costs pb, so altogether the Delta’s total expenditure is x plus the product of pb times b. In our static, one-period model, individuals lack a reason to save any income, and thus people will want to spend all their income. Similarly, individuals lack an opportunity to borrow, so people’s
29
spending will be limited to their income. Thus, Equation (3) is the
budget constraint for a Delta.
The form of preferences we have assumed for Deltas implies that
their optimal consumption choice is to spend the fraction Į of income
on the generic consumption good and the remainder on the amenity.
Thus, optimal consumption levels for a Delta are given by
x* = Į × Yǻ and b* = (1 – Į) × Yǻ / pb

(4)

30

if she works for pay, and zero otherwise. If the Delta works, then her
utility will be
28

In an equilibrium model like this one, we lose no generality in making such a normalization because only relative prices matter. As a result, we simply choose to measure the currency in
convenient units.
29 Abstracting from saving does not limit this model’s applicability to the case of pension
plans. In such cases, we could simply reinterpret the model so that b is retirement income, in
which case pb reflects the interest rate at which saving is possible and Yǻ is the present value of a
Delta’s lifetime income. The assumption that Omegas get no utility from retirement income is
then equivalent to assuming that they do not live to retirement. Obviously, this assumption is
extreme, but the only important point is that Omegas’ life expectancy is shorter; we could easily
generalize the model to allow Omegas to care about retirement positively but less than Deltas,
due to shorter life expectancy.
30 To see why Equation (4) holds, first consider optimal consumption on the generic good.
The Delta spends the fraction Į of her income Yǻ on this good, and each unit of x costs one
dollar, since the price of x is one by assumption. Thus, she will buy Į × Yǻ units of this good. She
will spend the remainder of her income, (1 – Į) × Yǻ, on the amenity good. Its price is pb, so we
must have pb × b* = (1 – Į) × Yǻ, and dividing by pb yields the expression in the text.
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1-1
Uǻ,work = [ĮĮ(1 – Į) ĮpbĮ ] × Yǻ – c

(5)

= vĮ(pb) × Yǻ – c,

(6)

where the first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the result of plugging in the optimal consumption levels in (4) to the utility function in
(1). The function vĮ(pb) collects the part of Uǻ,work that varies with the
preference parameter and the amenity price. The important thing to
notice is that this function, and thus the highest possible value of utility,
Uǻ,work, is a decreasing function of the amenity price.
The above assumptions imply that if a Delta forgoes work, then
31
her utility will be zero. Thus, she will work for pay if and only if the
right-hand side of (6) is non-negative. In other words, inducing Deltas
to work requires that firms pay them at least enough income, Yǻ, to
allow them to realize c units of consumption utility.
Next, consider the simpler case of Omegas. Let Yȍ be an Omega’s
income if she works for pay, and again assume zero income for nonworkers. Omegas have very simple consumption plans based on (2): they
consume all their income by purchasing the generic good and spend
nothing on the amenity good. Since each unit of the generic good costs
one unit of income, this means that Omegas will consume Yȍ units of
the generic good. Utility for working Omegas is thus
Uȍ,work = Yȍ – c.

(7)

As with Deltas, Omegas will work if and only if this utility level is at
least zero, since that is their utility if they do not work. Thus, an Omega
worker will be willing to work if and only if she is paid at least Yȍ.
2. Labor market equilibrium without fringe benefits.
We are interested in equilibria in which both Deltas and Omegas
are employed. A firm will be willing to employ a worker if the revenue
the firm gets by selling the worker’s output is at least as great as the
32
cost of employing the worker. Since the price of the generic good is
one dollar and each worker produces Q units if hired, each firm’s revenue will be Q dollars times the number of workers it hires. Its cost
will be Yǻ if it employs a Delta and Yȍ if it employs an Omega.
We will assume perfectly competitive goods and labor markets. We
do so because (1) finding discriminatory equilibria in models without
perfect competition is easy, and (2) finding them in models with perfect

31 This is another normalization: it does not affect any result but simply involves choosing a
convenient basis for measurement.
32 We assume away all other costs for exposition; again, this assumption is not essential.
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33

competition is difficult. Since all workers in the model are equally productive, incomes will be equalized across workers in any perfectly competitive equilibrium in which workers are paid in cash only (that is, in
which no fringe benefits exist). Since we assume all workers are equally
productive, if some workers were paid less than others, firms would
compete for the lower-paid workers, bidding up their wages until all
incomes were equal, contradicting the premise of unequal pay. Thus, in
this simple model, we have the result that Yǻ = Yȍ = Y.
Moreover, this amount of income will exactly equal Q, the revenue that firms realize by producing goods. This is true because (1) any
firm paying more than Q dollars to its worker will lose money and go
out of business, and (2) any firm paying less than Q will find its worker’s wage bid up by other firms seeking to hire the worker away for a
wage between the incumbent’s wage and the level Q. Thus, only Q is a
feasible equilibrium wage. Since Equation (7) tells us that Omegas’
utility when they work is Yȍ – c, and since Yȍ = Q, Omegas will work if
and only if Q  c. Similarly, Equation (6) shows that Deltas will work
if and only if vĮ(pb) × Q  c. To focus on the only interesting case, when
both types of workers work in equilibrium, we assume that Q is at
least as great as c or c / vĮ(pb), whichever is greater; again we expe34
rience no loss of generality here.
If all firms simply offered the wage Q to workers, then no reason
exists to think Deltas were more likely than Omegas to work at any
given firm. In fact, the only mechanism for a firm to attract only Deltas
would be to pay them a higher wage than other firms. But in a perfectly
competitive equilibrium, we have argued that this wage strategy is impossible as these firms would go bankrupt. Of course, in such an economy, prejudiced firms could refuse to hire Omegas. However, such firms
cannot be sure that they would be able to find any Deltas to hire.
Should Deltas all happen to work at other firms, a prejudiced firm
would not be able to hire the Delta away without paying an abovemarket wage, and doing so would bankrupt the firm. Meanwhile, in the
absence of antidiscrimination laws, no guarantee exists that in equilibrium, an Omega will be able to work for a particular prejudiced firm.
But it will necessarily be true that each Omega will be able to work
for some firm, at the same wage as is paid to Deltas who work for any

33 See Becker, Economics of Discrimination at 36 (cited in note 1) (explaining that in a
perfectly competitive labor market, firms that discriminate always face larger costs than firms
that do not).
34 These assumptions simply require that both types of worker are productive enough that
working is not a waste of their time.
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35

firm. For this reason, many scholars believe that competition drives
36
out taste-based discrimination.
3. Labor market equilibrium with fringe benefits.
Now we allow for firms to pay both fringe benefits and cash wages. Firms will provide compensation by giving fringe-receiving workers
some number of units of the amenity good. We assume that workers
37
cannot resell these fringe benefits. Since Omegas place no value on
the amenity good, intuition suggests that employers should be able to
design a combination of wages and amenities compensation that will
(1) attract Deltas and (2) repel Omegas. This intuition is correct, as we
now show. However, some additional surprising results occur as well.
a) Firms face amenity price pb. Consider a firm that wishes to hire
only Deltas. Suppose this firm offers a cash wage amount, Yf, less than
the labor disutility, c, together with some positive number, bf , of units of
the amenity good. We refer to this compensation plan as F = (Yf , bf).
Omegas place no value on the amenity goods, and we have assumed
away the possibility of resale. Therefore, the value of this compensation
to an Omega is simply the Yf units of the generic good that the Omega
can purchase with the cash wage. Since Yf < c by assumption, an Omega
would rather have zero income than work for this compensation plan.
Will compensation plan F attract Deltas? Suppose that bf  b* from
Equation (4). This will cost the firm pb × b* = (1 – Į) × Q. Suppose the
firm combines this fringe-benefit level with the cash wage Yf = Į × Q.
This compensation plan costs the firm exactly Q dollars, which is the
break-even worker cost that allows firms to produce in competitive
equilibrium, as explained above. Thus, this compensation plan is feasible from the firm’s point of view. The compensation plan also allows a
35 If discrimination is per se harmful, rather than harmful only in its impact on workers’
consumption opportunities, then of course the equilibrium level of well-being would be different
with antidiscrimination laws. We could account for such a harm by subtracting a term from the
utility level Uǻ in Equation (1), and possibly also for Uȍ in Equation (2); this utility reduction
would occur for a worker only when the workforce is segregated. Importantly, the reduction
would not affect the way in which either worker is willing to substitute consumption of x for
consumption of b, or the work/no-work decision. For this reason, accounting for such harm in
this way affects conclusions about workers’ welfare in equilibrium but not about the allocation
of resources. But consumption levels themselves cannot be affected by discriminatory preferences of firms in a cash-only equilibrium like this one.
36 The classic exception occurs when consumers possess a taste for discrimination. In such
cases, firms that treat workers symmetrically may lose business. Hence, civil rights laws would
have been necessary to eradicate taste-based discrimination in, for example, the Jim Crow states
(1) even after the elimination of state mandates of discrimination and (2) even if all markets
were perfectly competitive, provided that (3) sufficiently many consumers were prejudiced.
37 This assumption is stronger than necessary. We just need the cost of resale to be sufficiently positive (in other words, transaction costs are nonzero).
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Delta to attain exactly the consumption bundle she would have chosen for herself had she been paid Q dollars in cash and nothing in
fringe benefits. Since we assumed previously that Į and the amenity
price pb were such that Deltas would choose to work when offered the
wage Q, they will also choose to work when offered the compensation
plan F just described.
We conclude that there exists a segregated equilibrium in which
some firms—those that screen out Omegas, which we call screening
firms—offer compensation plan F only, and other firms offer a cash
wage of Q together with no fringe benefits. In this equilibrium: (1) only
Deltas work for the screening firms, (2) Omegas work only for cash38
only firms, and (3) some Deltas may work for cash-only firms. We can
also show that when Deltas strictly prefer to work when offered a nofringe wage of Q, firms can design a variety of compensation plans
39
that generate segregated equilibria with fringe benefits. It can be
shown that all equilibria require that the cost of a screening firm’s
compensation plan equal Q. Any firm that pays less than that will face
competition for its workers, as before. Finally, we note that when no
prejudiced firm owners exist, the equilibrium from the prior Part is
also an equilibrium here. We have thus shown that when firms face the
same amenity price as consumers, they can design a compensation
plan that both repels Omegas and attracts Deltas, and allows the firm
to stay in business in competitive equilibrium.
b) Firms face amenity price pbf < pb. Next, we consider the case
when firms have a price advantage relative to consumers in purchasing the amenity, so that pbf < pb. An example is group purchase of insurance plans, but many other examples exist. In equilibrium, this
price advantage means that Deltas must always be paid a compensation plan that involves fringe benefits. The reason is simple: any firm

38

For simplicity, we assume that neither type of worker is unemployed in equilibrium; free
entry by firms is sufficient for this result. For similar reasons, we assume (1) that there are fewer
prejudiced firms than there are Deltas or (2) that prejudiced firm owners would prefer to operate
with an Omega than to go out of business. Assumption (1) ensures that in segregated equilibria, all
prejudiced employers hire only Deltas. Assumption (2) ensures that Omegas will be employed in a
segregated equilibrium even if Deltas are rationed in such an equilibrium. It would be straightforward to derive assumption (1) as a result of a slightly more general model that required capital for
production, with capital having positive opportunity cost. In such a model, prejudiced employers
who are unable to hire Deltas would exit the industry, choosing to do something else with their
costly capital. Since the return on capital in this industry would rise, other, nonprejudiced capital
owners would then enter, and these employers would be willing to hire Omegas. This entry would
continue until the industry had no more unemployed Omegas, at which point we would have an
equilibrium like the one described in the text. These sorts of assumptions and arguments are
conventional in the study of how perfect competition interacts with taste-based preferences.
39 In each of these equilibria, screening firms offer a fringe level b that is more than zero
f
but less than b*, with the cash wage then equaling Q minus pb × bf .
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that pays a Delta only in cash is providing less than the maximum
possible benefit that can be provided at that cost. Another firm could
offer to pay the Delta slightly less in cash together with some fringe
benefits. Because firms acquire the fringe benefits more cheaply than
Deltas, the second firm could provide greater utility to the Delta than
the first, while paying less to do so. The Delta would switch jobs and
the second firm would earn a greater profit than the first. Thus, no
competitive equilibrium exists in which any Delta is paid only in cash.
In fact, firms’ advantage in purchasing the amenity means that
Deltas will want their employers to purchase all units of the amenity
that the Deltas consume. As in the models above, equilibrium requires
that firms pay Q for each worker, whether Delta or Omega; if a firm
paid less than that, our familiar compensation-competition story would
apply. Thus, Deltas will be paid a cash-and-fringe compensation plan
that costs Q dollars, while Omegas will once again be paid Q dollars in
cash. To find the utility level for Deltas in equilibrium, we need only
act as if the Deltas themselves faced the firms’ amenity price, pbf, rather than the higher price of pb. Thus, we simply plug pbf into Equation
(6) above, yielding
Uǻ,f = vĮ(pbf) × Q – c.

(8)

Now, it is easy to show that when pbf < pb, it must be true that
vĮ(pbf) > vĮ(pb),

(9)

Uǻ,f > Uǻ,cash only = vĮ(pb) × Q – c.

(10)

and this implies that
We have thus shown that when firms have an amenity price advantage relative to consumers, Deltas’ utility is strictly greater in the
with-fringe equilibrium than it would be if regulators banned fringe
benefits. This equilibrium, which is unique under the argument above,
is segregated. However, since Omegas continue to receive cash compensation in the amount of Q dollars, their equilibrium utility is unaffected by the existence of fringe compensation: banning fringe compensation plans would not increase Omegas’ utility. A fringe ban in
the presence of an amenity price advantage on the part of firms would
simply cause deadweight loss by forcing Deltas to purchase amenities
at an unnecessarily high price, while giving nothing extra to Omegas.
Notice that if firms must provide only one compensation plan, workers
will be segregated in equilibrium even if no employers harbor animus
toward Omegas: the fact that employers have a cost advantage in providing the amenity, while worker type is perfectly correlated with
amenity preference, ensures full separation of workers. If firms can
offer compensation menus, however, then unprejudiced employers can
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avoid segregation by offering workers their choice of plan F or allcash compensation of Q dollars.
B.

Summary and Discussion of Extensions

In Part I.A.3.a, we considered the case in which firms must pay
the same price per unit of the amenity as workers. In Part I.A.3.b, we
assumed that firms face a lower cost, perhaps because of economies of
scale. We defined a segregated equilibrium as one in which a preju40
diced employer can guarantee that she will be able to hire a Delta.
We showed that segregated equilibria exist in both cases. When
firms possess no cost advantages for amenities, multiple equilibria exist,
including a nonsegregated one in which employers pay every worker
in wages only. When firms possess an amenity cost advantage and
cannot offer workers a choice between compensation plans, a unique
equilibrium exists, and it is segregated. Interestingly, Omegas are just as
economically well-off in terms of consumption-based utility in this equilibrium as they would be in the equilibrium discussed in Part I.A.3. In
other words, they would not benefit economically from eliminating
fringe-induced segregation. However, Deltas are strictly better off in
the segregated equilibrium than in the no-fringe equilibrium when
firms have a cost advantage. Hence, banning segregation-inducing
fringe compensation would (1) eradicate segregation, (2) not improve
the economic welfare of Omegas, and (3) economically harm Deltas.
Some firms may possess market power in either the labor or
product markets, which would allow economically harmful discrimination to persist. Fringe-generated segregation might be especially troublesome in such market power cases because employers could use it to
skirt easily monitored disparate treatment proscriptions. Banning fringe
benefits would still harm Deltas if firms have an amenity price advantage, though with market power, such a ban could also help Omegas.
Regulators could prevent fringe-based discrimination in this model
without harming Deltas by mandating that firms offering fringe benefits also offer a cash-only compensation plan whose wage/salary
41
equals the cost to the firm of the cash-and-fringe compensation plan.

40 For exposition, we have assumed that firms hire either zero or one workers. However,
this assumption is not necessary; we could have assumed that firms hire as many workers as they
can, with the same production technology described above. Firms that hire numerous workers
using only one type of compensation would then be segregated firms, which is the basis for our
definition of segregated equilibrium in the text.
41 It is important to note that the proper mandate would involve the cost of the cash-andfringe compensation plan to the firm, not its value to Deltas. Mandating the latter would have
the effect of raising the cost of employing Omegas relative to Deltas, even though each type of
worker is equally productive.
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Regulators may experience difficulties monitoring such details, though
42
how much difficulty will vary with the case.
It is, of course, also possible that segregation is undesirable in its
own right—because integrated workplaces break down stereotypes,
because individuals incur psychic costs in experiencing discrimination
even if they voluntarily sort themselves into nondiscriminatory
workplaces, or because the individuals who do not sort themselves out
43
may incur psychic costs in a segregated workplace. In such situations,
reducing the net pecuniary compensation received by Deltas might be
worthwhile in order to bring about an integrated economy. Dealing
with either of these extensions would markedly change the welfare
implications of the segregated result, and we do not discount the relevance of either case. However, in terms of consumption utility, segregation induced by fringe compensation does not harm the group
that is “segregated against,” given perfect competition.
II. ILLUSTRATIONS
In this Part, we first intuitively describe the conditions necessary
to create the segregated equilibria described above. We then provide
several practical examples in which employers may adopt some conditions. As implied above, in the case of intentional passive discrimination, the intuition of the model requires that the employer be able to
identify a good (or a bundle of goods) that satisfies three conditions:
(1) the employer knows that the disfavored group values the good on
average at a lower amount than other groups of potential employees
place on the good; (2) the good is nontransferable; and (3) the employer provides the good for a lower cost than the individuals can
purchase it outsider of the employment relationship. The third condition generates the most interesting case because when it holds, the
employer can ensure that it attracts the favored type of employee.
Each of these conditions merits some discussion. To sort adequately, employers need to identify a good with differential group valuation so as to ensure that the “right” kind of employee will be more
attracted to the job’s benefit than will individuals from the group it
seeks to discriminate against. Otherwise, if no known systematic valu42 In more general settings, where all types of workers may prefer some degree of amenities, the
analogous mandate would require offering a menu-style compensation package that allows workers
to pick among various cash-and-fringe compensation plans whose costs to the firm all are equal.
43 See Devah Pager and Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 Ann Rev Sociology 181, 183
(2008) (suggesting that “those who perceive high levels of discrimination are more likely to
experience depression, anxiety, and other negative health outcomes”). This phenomenon could
be modeled as discussed in note 35.
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ation difference between the groups exists, employers should expect
any compensation package would draw applicants from the various
groups of potential employees in proportion to their numbers in the
44
labor market at large.
Closely related to the first condition, the second condition requires
that employees cannot simply sell or trade the good from their compensation package. If employees could undertake such a transaction, members of the disfavored group could take the job and then, in some secondary market, sell the good to members of the favored groups. In such
a scenario, employees from the disfavored group perceive no downside
from taking the job and then equalizing their cash wages relative to
other employment opportunities through these sales. Formally, the con45
dition of nontransferability is stronger than necessary.
The last condition, that the employer can provide the good more
cheaply than the worker could purchase it outside of the employment
context, is not required. When it does not hold, employees from favored
groups will wind up indifferent between working for the discriminating employer and receiving mixed cash-and-fringe compensation on the
one hand, and working for another employer that offers only wages on
the other. By contrast, when employers can purchase the amenity more
cheaply than can workers, workers from favored groups will have a
strict preference for receiving mixed compensation.
While we have thus far focused our attention on intentional passive discrimination, the phenomenon could arise as the accidental byproduct of a compensation package designed to achieve other purposes.
For example, in the illustration offered in the Introduction, a brewery
whose owners and managers are indifferent regarding employing Deltas
and Omegas might still want to offer free beer during lunch because it
believes that doing so promotes corporate loyalty and knowledge of the
product. In such a case, even if the brewery starts out offering this benefit plus a market wage, Deltas who do not secure positions will offer to
work for a lower wage given their valuation of the free beer. Eventually,
this group valuation will lead to a workforce composed of Deltas, to the
exclusion of Omegas. In fact, this outcome will arise even if the brewery
operators are originally completely unaware of the differential valua46
tion of the beer between the two groups.

44 This condition is analogous to the now well-known single-crossing condition first discussed by Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J of Econ 355 (1973), and J.A. Mirrlees,
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev Econ Stud 175 (1971).
45 It is sufficient to require that such secondary market sales entail nontrivial transactions costs.
46 In such a situation, the second and third conditions are satisfied. As for the first condition, the employer acts intending to craft the conditions, but without a discriminatory intent to
achieve a segregated equilibrium.
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This outcome implies that, as an analytical matter, the employers’
intent is not a necessary element in skewing the firm’s workforce toward a particular group. Compensation packages will draw the group
that has a relatively high preference for the nonwage component(s) of
the compensation bundle and repel the group that places a relatively
low value on the noncash pay. With this in mind, as we provide some
illustrations of how value heterogeneity might generate segregation
across firms below, we make no inference regarding the employers’
intent in these situations.
A. Race
One example of possible discriminatory screening practices relates to subjective discount rates and pay structures that include a deferred compensation component such as a pension. Ample evidence
demonstrates heterogeneity in subjective discount rates across racial
groups. To begin with some background, a person’s subjective discount
rate captures her willingness to delay current consumption for the
prospect of increased future consumption. All other things equal,
people prefer current consumption over future consumption, which is
why virtually no one would view giving her money to a bank for a fixed
period, say one year, as an attractive option if the bank only promised
47
to pay back the same sum at the end of the period. Even if the individual views the bank as perfectly safe, in the sense that the bank is
100 percent likely to pay in accordance with its promise, almost no
individual would choose this option.
An individual’s subjective discount rate represents how much an
individual needs to be paid to delay consumption for a single period.
For example, if an individual requires a total payment of $110 in order to
48
turn over her current holding of $100 for the next year, the implied
subjective discount rate for that person is 10 percent per year. While
everyone exhibits some positive subjective discount rate, individual-toindividual heterogeneity exists in those subjective discount rates. Thus,
another person may only require a $5 interest payment (5 percent discount rate) to give up the $100 today, while a third individual may only

47 People will sometimes keep their money in a bank account even if it does not pay interest on the money because of the costs associated with storing large amounts of cash, namely the
risk of theft. Keeping money in the bank may also make other types of transactions more secure
(for example, mailing a bank check instead of cash). However, even accounting for these benefits, most individuals would be unwilling to make a deposit if subsequent withdrawal were restricted to only take place after a nontrivial time period, unless they were compensated through
the payment of interest.
48 In other words, the individual gives up $100 now and receives the original $100 plus $10
interest at the end of the one-year period.
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be willing to undertake the transaction for the promise of receiving $120
49
at the end of the year (20 percent discount rate). Scholars offer a number of explanations for this orientation toward favoring current consumption over future consumption. One simple explanation is that indi50
viduals do not know if they will live to consume in the future period.
51
Other evolutionary-based explanations have been offered as well.
While individual-level heterogeneity in subjective discount rates
is prevalent, labor economists have noted that systematic differences
in individual discount rates across racial groups may exist as well. In
other words, while individuals within a given race may exhibit a wide
range of subjective discount rates, different races, looked at as a group,
will yield meaningfully different distributions of discount rates. Of
course, every individual of race Y is unlikely to exhibit a higher discount rate than every individual of race Z, but rather, the average discount rate among individuals of race Y will sometimes diverge from
52
the average discount rate among individuals of race Z.
A natural experiment analyzed by John Warner and Saul Pleeter
53
provides some interesting supporting evidence. Warner and Pleeter
examined an instance in which the Department of Defense offered
two different separation benefit packages to enlisted personnel and
officers in the US military beginning in 1992. The two options involved
a lump sum payment and an annuity payment. In discounted present
value terms, the two options were equivalent for individuals with annual
54
subjective discount rates of around 17.5 percent. In other words, if one
calculated what the annuity payments were worth in total at the moment payments began, a person with a discount rate lower than 17.5
percent would prefer to take the annuity, while a person with a discount rate higher than that would prefer the lump sum payment.

49 As a general rule, if the amount the individual gives up now is represented by PV and
the smallest amount the individual is willing to accept in compensation at the end of n periods is
represented as FV, then the individual’s subjective discount rate per period is calculated as:

( (
50

See Zvi Bodie and Robert C. Merton, Finance 49 (Prentice-Hall 2000) (explaining how
uncertainty about the time of death affects the rate of interest).
51 For an example, see Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, Uncertainty and Hyperbolic
Discounting, 95 Am Econ Rev 1290, 1290 (2005) (suggesting that the phenomenon of hyperbolic
discounting, in which impatience is increased by shorter time horizons, may be the result of
evolutionary forces shaping preferences in times of uncertainty in order to maximize survival).
52 Perhaps higher moments (variance, skewness, and so forth) of the distributions differ too.
53 John T. Warner and Saul Pleeter, The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military
Downsizing Programs, 91 Am Econ Rev 33 (2001).
54 Id at 35 table 1. The break-even discount rate varied based on military status. See id.
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By examining the individual’s decision regarding which benefit to
take, Warner and Pleeter can infer whether the individual’s subjective
discount rate is higher or lower than the associated break-even discount
rate. Because of the detailed data, the researchers examined what effect
various characteristics had on the benefit decision and thus on the associated average subjective discount rate. For our purposes, the most interesting finding to emerge from this study was the large racial heterogeneity observed in discount rates. Specifically, conditional on a large
55
number of other effects, black military enlistees and officers exhibited
significantly higher subjective discount rates than other minorities and
56
whites. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, and
the difference is large, with blacks exhibiting, on average, discount rates
57
on the order of five to nine times as great as whites. Although this particular study is limited to military personnel, we have confidence in its
external validity, as it deals with real and substantial decisions (as opposed to experimental tests, which are generally performed over small
stakes). Further, the main result of interest for our purposes is consistent with what other studies find regarding a higher average subjective
58
discount rate for African-Americans in broader datasets.
59
Assuming this empirical regularity holds, an employer wishing to
passively exclude blacks from her workforce could offer a low current
wage coupled with generous deferred compensation benefits such as a

55 The various controls included sex, number of dependents, education level, wage level,
benefit level, year of decision, age, years of service, geographic region, service branch, IQ score,
and specialty controls. See id at 43–49.
56 Warner and Pleeter, 91 Am Econ Rev at 45 table 4, 47 table 5 (cited in note 53).
57 See id.
58 For an older study finding this result, see Emily C. Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time
Preference: Evidence from Panel Data, 99 J Polit Econ 54, 72 (1991) (inferring time preference rates
from trends in household food consumption). For a more recent study, see generally Melvin Stephens,
Jr and Erin L. Krupka, Subjective Discount Rates and Household Behavior (Working Paper, Aug 2006),
online at http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/ekrupka/discount_08_30_06.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009).
59 Note that we make no general claim to the validity of the empirical finding except to note the
high quality of the research papers we cite finding this result. Our primary purpose is one of illustration. Further, we most certainly do not offer an explanation for why subjective discount rate heterogeneity may follow this pattern. A number of logical possibilities present themselves, such as the lower
lifespan expectation for African-Americans at most points along the age distribution, higher borrowing costs, and lower permanent incomes. See Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 54 Natl Vital
Statistics Rep 1, 3 table A (2006), online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_14.pdf
(visited Apr 14, 2009) (providing life expectancy by age, race, and sex); John V. Duca and Stuart S.
Rosenthal, Borrowing Constraints, Household Debt, and Racial Discrimination in Loan Markets, 3 J
Fin Intermediation 77, 92 (1993) (observing that Federal Reserve data suggests that lenders set
tighter credit limits for nonwhite borrowers); Joseph G. Altonji and Ulrich Doraszelski, The Role
of Permanent Income and Demographics in Black/White Differences in Wealth, 40 J Hum Res 1, 10
(2005) (concluding that black men would have 20 percent more wealth if they earned the same
permanent income as white men). Determining the causal mechanism behind this empirical regularity is beyond the scope of this Article.
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large pension or a substantial match in a defined contribution plan.
Such a package will attract individuals with relatively low subjective discount rates, whereas it will repel those individuals with high subjective
discount rates, as they will view the package as being worth less than other available compensation options (offered by nondiscriminating employers). Note further that this could also represent a situation where a
nondiscriminatory employer might engage in unintentional passive discrimination, as employers may possess numerous other reasons to include a generous retirement component in its compensation package,
as discussed in Part E.
B.

Sex

While the evidence above suggests subjective discount rate heterogeneity across races, evidence of heterogeneity also exists in the closely
related concept of risk aversion among men and women. Specifically,
many scholars agree that men exhibit a greater propensity to engage in
60
risky activities than do women. More precisely, women appear to require a larger premium to accept a given increase in income volatility
61
than do men. A number of causal explanations have been offered, but
for our purposes, we need note only the observed existence of this
62
63
differential. Experimental and observational studies well establish

60 Of course, any individual woman may be more risk-seeking than any individual man or
than the average man.
61 For example, many evolutionary psychologists explain this tendency as a manifestation of
the handicap principle. If risk-taking is associated with higher mortality rates, then all other things
being equal, high-quality males will find risky behavior less dangerous than low-quality males will,
making the risk-taking behavior more affordable for high-quality males. Thus, potential mates can
infer quality from risk-taking propensities. For a discussion along these lines, see Louise Barrett,
Robin Dunbar, and John Lycett, Human Evolutionary Psychology, 114–18 (Palgrave 2002)
(suggesting that male risk-taking may be a method for advertising strong genes). For a formal
model, see Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk
in Winner-take-all Games, 87 J Econ Theory 125, 126 (1999) (emphasizing the selection advantages of male risk-taking in animal groups in which the dominant male mates with all (or
most) of the females).
62 Among the relevant experimental studies, see Gerlinde Fellner and Boris Maciejovsky,
Risk Attitude and Market Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets, 28 J Econ Psych
338, 346 (2007) (noting female risk aversion in binary lottery choices); Peter Brooks and Horst
Zank, Loss Averse Behavior, 31 J Risk & Uncertainty 301, 317–18 (2005) (observing that “[t]here
are no risk seeking women”); Mette Wik, et al, On the Measurement of Risk Aversion from Experimental Data, 36 App Econ 2443, 2449 (2004) (finding female risk aversion in Northern Zambian agricultural communities).
63 Relevant observational studies include John D. Leeth and John Ruser, Compensating
Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 257, 262–67 (2003) (observing that women exact greater risk premiums in the workplace);
Peggy D. Dwyer, James H. Gilkeson, and John A. List, Gender Differences in Revealed Risk
Taking: Evidence from Mutual Fund Investors, 76 Econ Letters 151, 156 (2002) (demonstrating
that women tend to take less risky positions when choosing mutual funds); Alma Cohen and
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64

this result. Courts have also credited this observation, such as in the
seminal case Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Sears,
65
Roebuck & Co.
An employer wishing to screen out female workers could exploit
this empirical regularity by offering a highly volatile compensation
package. For example, the employer could offer most of the job’s compensation in the form of an employer match to a defined contribution
plan and then restrict the available investment vehicles to high-risk
66
portfolios. Alternatively, the employer could simply make a large fraction of the employee’s compensation contingent on meeting some variable performance goals, such as paying on a commission basis or
through a profit-sharing arrangement. In fact, Peggy Dwyer, James Gilkeson, and John List speculate that the paucity of women in the field of
mutual fund investment management may be related to the industry’s
67
practice of setting compensation as a share of performance. Some related evidence also suggests that organizing the workplace on the basis of competitive tournaments where employees compete head-to-head
for bonus pay could induce women to forego the employment opportu68
nity. The literature also suggests the possibility that employers desiring
a predominantly male workforce, at least in some industries, could substitute higher wages for increased on-the-job safety, given that the risk
aversion differential appears to spill over into safety-risk evaluation as

Liran Einav, Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice, 97 Am Econ Rev 745, 760–61
(2007) (explaining that an econometric model based on observed auto insurance deductible
choices reveals female risk aversion).
64 For a meta-analysis of a large number of studies on this topic, see James P. Byrnes, David
C. Miller, and William D. Schafer, Gender Differences in Risk Taking: A Meta-analysis, 125 Psych
Bull 367, 377 (1999) (finding that while males are more likely to take risks than females, the size
of the difference varies and shifts according to context and age level).
65 628 F Supp 1264, 1310 (ND Ill 1986).
66 To some extent, § 404(c) of ERISA precludes this through its requirement that retirement plans offer a “broad range” of investment alternatives. See Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 § 404(c), Pub L 93-406, 88 Stat 877, codified at 29 USC § 1104(c); 29 CFR
§ 2550.404c-5(c)(6). See also Regina Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution
Plans, 4 Fla Tax Rev 607, 632–34 & n 111 (2000).
67 Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List, 76 Econ Letters at 157 (cited in note 63), citing Judith Chevalier
and Glenn Ellison, Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross-sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance, 54 J Fin 875, 896 (1999) (noting that only 7 percent of the
mutual fund managers in the study’s sample were women).
68 See, for example, Nabanita Datta Gupta, Anders Poulsen, and Marie-Claire Villeval,
Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Experimental Evidence 2 (IZA Discussion Paper
No 1833, Nov 2005), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=851227 (visited Apr 14, 2009) (observing
that men were more likely than women to choose tournament schemes); Muriel Niederle and
Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q J
Econ 1067, 1097 (2007) (noting that female preferences for nontournament compensation was
not correlated with an inferior capability to compete in the task).
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69

well. Of course, other nondiscriminatory reasons to organize compensation packages in these ways likely exist, but differential risk aversion
suggests another instance where an employer with discriminatory in70
tent could passively induce the desired workforce.
C.

Religion

Religion also raises a number of potentially interesting illustrations. For example, businesses without Sunday hours may be relatively
more attractive employers for religious Christians since these individuals may value a day off on Sunday more than a randomly chosen individual due to their religious obligation to attend worship services and to
generally limit activity on the Christian Sabbath day. The fast food franchisor Chick-fil-A provides a particularly striking illustration of this
insight. Chick-fil-A, founded by S. Truett Cathy, “a devoutly religious
man who built his life and business based on hard work, humanity, and
71
biblical principles,” requires that all of its locations be closed on Sun72
days “without exception.”
This practice could generate passive discrimination at two levels.
As indicated above, employees who value having a Sunday-free schedule relatively highly will be disproportionately attracted to apply for
and accept Chick-fil-A positions. Perhaps more importantly, franchisees
who are not religious Christians will be discouraged from opening franchises with the franchisor. Relative to other fast food chains, Chick-fil-A
effectively requires that the franchisee forego one-seventh of its poten73
tial revenues. While a religious Christian may view this revenue loss as
a reasonable religious sacrifice, the nonreligious, or those who recognize
a different holy day (for example, Fridays for Muslims or Saturdays for
Jews) will not. This no-Sundays policy renders Chick-fil-A franchises
relatively more “expensive” for non-Christian franchisees.

69 See, for example, Thomas DeLeire and Helen Levy, Worker Sorting and the Risk of
Death on the Job, 22 J Labor Econ 925, 926–27 (2004) (estimating that about one-quarter of
occupational gender segregation is due to differential death risks across jobs).
70 The converse is also true. Employers seeking to attract members of a protected class
may design or alter their compensation packages to reduce or eliminate the aspects that make
them unattractive to such individuals. For instance, after 1977, Sears Roebuck “changed its method of compensating commission salespersons to a ‘salary plus commission basis’. . . to reduce
the financial risk of selling on commission in an effort to attract more women to commission
sales.” Sears, 628 F Supp at 1289.
71 Chick-fil-A, S. Truett Cathy, online at http://www.chick-fil-a.com/#struettcathy (visited
Apr 14, 2009).
72 Id.
73 The one-seventh figure is only illustrative since a potential location may not have its
revenues distributed uniformly across the days of the week, but the point remains that the closure almost surely generates a nontrivial loss of revenues for an individual franchisee.
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Religiously affiliated schools provide another example where religion might generate heterogeneous valuations among employees. These
types of private schools often include among their benefits free or reduced tuition for children of employees. While nonadherents of the
given religion may value the private school benefit, individuals practicing the religion affiliated with the school are likely to value the
benefit more highly, especially if the school infuses its curriculum with
74
the religion’s values and worldview.
A final example of religion-based passive discrimination is highlighted by the case Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc v The Superior
75
Court of Sacramento County. In that case, Catholic Charities, an independently incorporated entity which describes itself as “an organ of the
76
Catholic Church,” excluded contraception from its prescription drug
coverage plan, which covered its 183 full-time employees. Catholic
Charities maintained that they needed this exclusion to follow the
Roman Catholic Church’s teaching that considers contraception a sin.
Therefore, including birth control coverage under its plan would “im77
properly facilitate sin.” Litigation arose when Catholic Charities challenged a state law, the Women’s Contraception Equity Act (WCEA),
which required it to cover prescription contraceptives if it provided
group prescription drug coverage.
While the Charities’ claim that its religious mission precluded it
from subsidizing products prohibited by the Catholic Church is at least
78
plausible, the benefit restriction disproportionately affects religious
Catholics relative to others since the former, presumably, are less likely
to use birth control drugs than individuals from the latter group. Given that the restriction is less costly for religious Catholics, making the
compensation package relatively attractive to those individuals potentially leads to passive discrimination.

74 For a model and some empirical support of this proposition, see Danny Cohen-Zada,
Preserving Religious Identity through Education: Economic Analysis and Evidence from the US,
60 J Urb Econ 372, 393–94 (2006) (finding that religious parents are more likely to send their
child to a private school espousing their religion if their religion would be in the minority at the
local public school). For indirect evidence of the higher valuation of religious education by
members of the religion, see David L. Leal, Latinos and School Vouchers: Testing the “Minority
Support” Hypothesis, 85 Soc Sci Q 1227, 1236 (2004) (suggesting that Catholic religious affiliation explains why Latinos support school vouchers).
75 85 P3d 67 (Cal 2004).
76 Id at 75.
77 Id.
78 See id at 74–76. The California Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this claim,
explaining that Catholic Charities did not meet the criteria to be exempted from the WCEA as a
religious employer because its services were not aimed entirely at Catholics. See id at 76.
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D. Workplace Language Policies
Some scholars have touched upon a similar phenomenon regarding an employer’s choice to allow or encourage (or at least refrain
79
80
from discouraging) the use of foreign languages in the workplace. If
for various reasons the employer would prefer to hire members of a
certain ethnic group (for example, Latinos) to the exclusion of another
group of individuals competing in the same labor market (for exam81
ple, blacks), coupling a pro-foreign-language work policy with submarket wages might generate the desired segregation passively in
82
ways that regulators or employees themselves will not find obvious.
E.

Noninvidious Exploitation of Preference Heterogeneity

Although we are primarily concerned with screening that leads to
legally or normatively objectionable segregation, employers can exploit the same mechanism to achieve ends that most observers would
view positively. In fact, this kind of beneficial screening has been examined both theoretically and empirically.
One area where scholars have done significant empirical work
involves the question of whether employers can use their compensation packages, specifically deferred compensation or pensions, to attract desired types of employees while repelling disfavored types.
Joanne Salop and Steven Salop offered the first screening model in
this context, suggesting that, all other things equal, employers want to
hire individuals who are likely to stay for a long period. Because
workers often lack a mechanism to credibly transmit their private information regarding their propensity to stay, the employer may offer a
compensation contract that particularly entices “stayers” while it is
83
unattractive to “leavers.” Employers achieve their desired workforce
by conditioning a significant portion of the employee’s income on re-

79 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw U L Rev 1689,
1703–25 (2006) (evaluating the social costs of English-only workplace rules).
80 Conversely, if an employer wanted to screen out members of a particular ethnic group,
she could restrict the languages spoken in the workplace.
81 See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making
of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 Ohio St L J 961, 976–80 (2006) (hypothesizing that employers
deliberately create jobs that are undesirable to native workers in order to attract a subservient
immigrant workforce).
82 See Devon Carbado, Catherine Fisk, and Mitu Gulati, After Inclusion, 4 Ann Rev of L &
Soc Sci, 83, 85–86 (2008) (noting the risk of discrimination by inclusion); Lan Cao, The Diaspora of
Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 Wm & Mary L Rev 1521, 1613–16 (2003) (observing that
when employers refrain from an English language requirement coupled with low wages, they may
disproportionately draw from members of ethnic minority communities).
83 Joanne Salop and Steven Salop, Self-selection and Turnover in the Labor Market, 90 Q J
Econ 619, 627 (1976).
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maining with the employer for a sufficient period via pension benefits
that grow with time of service. Individuals who plan to move on quickly will find such an arrangement unattractive since they would then
84
earn submarket pay over the course of their employment. Because
having a mechanism by which employers can detect the employee’s
type is better in aggregate welfare terms, screening in this context is
85
generally unobjectionable and even normatively preferable.
Perhaps a more general way in which employers may exploit preference heterogeneity for more benign or even attractive ends is to use
below-market wages to ensure that only those individuals with a particular “taste” for the job apply. That is, many employers would like to have
employees who particularly “believe in” or enjoy working in a given position. However, at the hiring stage, every applicant possesses an incentive
to claim to have such tastes. As hiring and firing employees generally
entails meaningful costs, simply waiting until the individual is in the
position to determine whether she told the truth regarding her preferences is a bad strategy. One way to screen for employees with a high
consumption value with respect to the job is to purposefully offer submarket wages. By doing so, only those individuals who receive psychic
compensation from doing a job they love will rationally choose to accept the job. Examples of positions in the legal field where the pay is
relatively low (compared to feasible alternatives) but the supply of interested employees remains strong may include federal judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. All other things equal, the relatively low
pay may increase the likelihood that only very dedicated individuals
will accept these jobs.

84 A large empirical literature arose to examine this phenomenon. See, for example, Richard A. Ippolito, Stayers As “Workers” and “Savers”: Toward Reconciling the Pension-quit Literature, 37 J Hum Res 275, 305 (2002) (noting a correlation between saving for retirement and
staying on the job even when retirement benefits vest immediately); Richard A. Ippolito, A Study
of Wages and Reliability, 39 J L & Econ 149, 185, 187 (1996) (suggesting that a worker’s wages
may be affected by her expected and observed reliability); Steven G. Allen, Robert L. Clark, and
Ann A. McDermed, Pensions, Bonding, and Lifetime Jobs, 28 J Hum Res 463, 479 (1993) (suggesting that the low turnover of pensioned employees may be more related to a pension-providing
employer’s reluctance to lay off rather than the employees’ reluctance to leave); Alan L. Gustman and Thomas L. Steinmeier, Pension Portability and Labor Mobility: Evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 50 J Pub Econ 299, 315–17 (1993) (observing that
pension-covered jobs offer higher levels of compensation than workers can obtain elsewhere).
85 For support of this position, see Richard A. Ippolito, Pension Plans and Employee Performance: Evidence, Analysis, and Policy 155 (Chicago 1998) (noting the importance of employee
reliability and the benefits of compensation schemes that screen for reliable workers).

2009]

Passive Discrimination

823

III. THE INADEQUACY OF TITLE VII IN THE PASSIVE
DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT
86

We begin by describing the basic framework for Title VII claims.
We then note that passive discrimination poses some special problems
under existing doctrine. These doctrinal hurdles include the emphasis
on differential treatment rather than differential valuation under disparate treatment analysis, the likely exclusion of fringe benefits under disparate impact analysis, and courts’ focus on choice and so-called “lack
of interest.” We conclude this Part with a discussion of some important
limitations on a litigation approach to remedying workplace discrimination, with particular attention to how these limitations are likely to impede the successful use of Title VII in the passive discrimination context.
In determining the legality of passive discrimination, we begin
with the basic statutory framework. Title VII is the major federal legislation that governs workplace discrimination and courts generally rec87
ognize it is intended to reach broadly across employment practices.
Congress enacted this statute “to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices
which have fostered . . . stratified job environments to the disadvantage
88
of minority [or other protected] citizens.” Congress drafted Title VII
both to end workplace discrimination going forward and to remedy
89
individual injuries.
Many scholars and judges view Title VII as fostering individual
employee choice and counteracting employers’ impulse to apply group
90
stereotypes to individuals. The underlying intuition seems to be that

86 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42
USC § 2000e et seq.
87 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, HR Rep 570, 88th Cong,
1st Sess 2 (“The evidence before the committee makes it abundantly clear that job opportunity
discrimination permeates the national social fabric—North, South, East, and West. The act is
directed at correcting such abuses wherever found and is not focused upon any single section of
the country.”). See also Franks v Bowman Transportation Co, 424 US 747, 763 (1976) (“Congress
intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.”); McDonnell Douglas Co v Green, 411 US 792, 800 (1973) (stating that the “language of Title VII makes
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate
. . . discriminatory practices and devices”); Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424, 429 (1971)
(explaining that Congress’s objective in enacting Title VII was “to remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group”).
88 McDonnell, 411 US at 800.
89 See Oscar Mayer & Co v Evans, 441 US 750, 756 (1979).
90 See, for example, Sprogis v United Air Lines, Inc, 444 F2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir 1971) (“In
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”). See also City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart, 435 US
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regardless of whether a stereotype is true or false as to a disfavored
group, it may be false as to any individual who is a member of that
group. In the hiring context, for example, each individual should have
the opportunity to have her qualifications for a job evaluated and ex91
press her preference for such work.
While Congress hoped that mandating equal opportunity would
eradicate employment discrimination, Congress did not focus on directly ending workplace segregation but rather forecasted that integration would be a beneficial byproduct of ending active discrimination. With few exceptions, Title VII does not promote or even permit
quotas or other forms of affirmative action to address workplace se92
gregation. Congress decided to address employers’ ability to deny
equal opportunities to individuals because of their race, color, sex,
national origin, or religion, rather than dictate that employers achieve
equal representation or equal outcomes in workplaces. Thus, for example, while a segregated workplace may raise inferences about an
employer’s potentially discriminatory behavior, absent evidence of
direct discrimination, the decision by individuals in a protected group
not to work in a particular firm or even industry is generally unprob93
lematic. Thus, Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms or conditions or privileges of employment, be94
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”
702, 707 (1978) (“It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on
mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics of males or females.”).
91 For instance, as the Supreme Court noted in a case about female prison guards, “In the
usual case, the argument that a particular job is dangerous for women may appropriately be met
by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual to make that choice for
herself.” Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321, 335 (1977).
92 In fact, § 703(j) dictates that nothing in Title VII
shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the [protected characteristic] of such individual or group
on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any [protected characteristic] employed by any employer . . . in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such [protected characteristic] in any
community, State, section, or other area.
42 USC § 2000e-2(j).
93 If the numbers are bad enough, a firm might be concerned about a pattern-and-practice
lawsuit. See Hazelwood School District v United States, 433 US 299, 307–08 (1977) (“Where gross
statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof
of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”).
94 Section 703(2) also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42
USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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Passive discrimination might implicate two different prohibitions
contained in Title VII. First, some have suggested that the active crafting
of a sorting strategy might be construed as a failure or refusal to hire. We
are skeptical of this proposition, as our hypotheticals presume that employers attempt to get workers to self-sort but that they will also hire any
individual who accepts the offered compensation and fringe benefit
95
package. Second, such a sorting strategy might instead be construed as
“otherwise to discriminate with respect to compensation” and to “terms,
96
conditions or privileges of employment.” Congress elected not to define
this language so that courts would read these terms as broadly as possi97
ble. In offering illustrative examples, the Equal Employment Opportuni98
ty Commission (EEOC) guidelines interpret “compensation” to include
fringe benefits such as “medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and re99
tirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; [and] leave.” The
EEOC compliance manual also includes such practices or activities as
“duration of work, work rules, job assignments and duties” as terms,
100
conditions, or privileges of employment.
Despite its seemingly blanket prohibition on workplace discrimination, Title VII further states that employers may lawfully
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality or production . . . , provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
101
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
For example, to return to the brewery, employers may pay individual
workers performing the same sales job different wages based on the
amount of beer each is able to sell. So if all male employees sell more
beer than any female employee, the employer may permissibly pay all

95 Of course, in practice, an employer might both encourage self-sorting and refuse to hire individuals from a disfavored group. Such a combination of practices is easier to deal with under Title VII
than our hypothesized litigation-savvy employer or unintentional passive discriminator who lacks
any desire to exclude these individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group.
96 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
97 Rogers v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir 1971).
See also 1 EEOC Compliance Manual § 613.1(a) at 3002 (cited in note 12).
98 While courts have not decided how much deference is due to the EEOC interpretive
guidelines, as the EEOC is Title VII’s enforcement authority, courts often look to these guidelines
in making their decisions.
99 29 CFR § 1604.9(a).
100 1 EEOC Compliance Manual § 613.1(a) at 3002 (cited in note 12).
101 42 USC § 2000e-2(h). Under Title VII, “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.” 42 USC § 2000e(k).
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the men higher wages than all of the females though they all perform
the same job. We next turn to the specific claims and defenses relevant
to assessing passive discrimination under Title VII.
A. Disparate Treatment Claims
Under traditional Title VII jurisprudence, plaintiffs may choose
among disparate treatment and disparate impact claims to seek recovery for employment discrimination. Under the theory of disparate
treatment, “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat102
ment.” Employers charged with disparate treatment cannot raise a
103
business necessity defense. They may, however, in the absence of
direct evidence, prevail if the plaintiff is unable to prove that the defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the particular employment practice is a pretext for discrimination.
Within disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs may raise either individual claims or pattern-and-practice claims. In individual claims,
each plaintiff must prove that she was treated less favorably than others
similarly situated and this disparate treatment was “because of” the plaintiff’s race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. The plaintiff must provide
either direct or circumstantial evidence to demonstrate the employer’s
discriminatory intent. In pattern-and-practice cases, discriminatory intent
is also required, but the plaintiff can satisfy the prima facie case with “statistical evidence demonstrating substantial disparities in the application
104
of employment actions as to minorities and the unprotected groups.”
Pattern-and-practice plaintiffs need not present individual victim testimony to support a finding of intentional discrimination—courts may rely
105
purely on evidence of gross statistical disparity, which raises an inference of discriminatory intent. While disparate treatment, particularly in
pattern-and-practice cases, may evidence a concern about segregation,
courts link this concern to the elimination of discriminatory practices
that deprive individuals of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-

102

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 335 n 15 (1977).
See 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(2).
104 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 839 F2d 302, 308
(7th Cir 1988).
105 Id at 310–11. See also Hazelwood, 433 US at 307–08. Courts acknowledge that this use of
statistics is particularly important in hiring cases where individual applicants may not be aware
of other hirings. See, for example, Sears, 839 F2d at 312.
103
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106

versely affect their employment status, rather than view their role as
107
one requiring the direct eradication of segregation as an end in itself.
Under disparate treatment claims, whether individual or patternand-practice cases, Title VII prohibits the employer from using groupbased characteristics or preferences or stereotypes to treat individuals
differently even if such stereotypes are largely accurate. So, for example,
108
in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart,
the Supreme Court ruled that an employer may not deduct more from
women’s pay to cover their pensions even though, as an actuarial matter,
109
women as a class are likely to draw on pension benefits longer. Although economic reasoning rather than animus motivated the employer’s behavior, the Supreme Court reasoned that as any individual woman may not draw longer than any individual man, her employers may not
110
condition her pay based on her sex. Similarly, in Arizona Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation
111
Plans v Norris, the Supreme Court prohibited the employers’ use of
voluntary pension plans in which companies utilized sex-based mortality tables to justify paying women lower monthly retirement benefits
112
than those they paid to men who had made equivalent contributions.
In both cases, the Court rejected the employers’ proffered economic
113
rationale as irrelevant.
The mechanism of passive discrimination may take it out of the
realm of what counts as “discrimination” under Title VII. For instance, in
both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, courts look at the
market value of wages and fringe benefits provided by the employer or
the monetary amount of the deduction, rather than the subjective valuation by a particular disfavored group or by an individual within this
group. So in Manhart, the Supreme Court determined that the employer discriminated by taking more money from women than from men to
106

See, for example, Marion v Slaughter Co, 1999 WL 1267015, *6 (10th Cir).
See, for example, McDonnell Douglas Co, 411 US at 800 (explaining that because “[t]he
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities . . . . ‘[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination’”), quoting Griggs, 401 US at 430–31.
108 435 US 702 (1978).
109 See id at 711. In Manhart, the defendant used mortality tables and its own experience to
determine that the cost of a pension for the average retired female would be greater than for the
average retired male. The city required female employees to make greater monthly contributions
to the pension fund, which reduced the women’s take-home pay. See id at 705.
110 See id at 708. Notably, the Court rejected the argument that facially equal deductions
might impose a disparate impact on men who as a class were less likely to benefit as fully from
the pension plan. See id at 708–09.
111 463 US 1073 (1983).
112 See id at 1084–86 (“[E]ven a true generalization about a class cannot justify class-based
treatment.”).
113 See id at 1084; Manhart, 435 US at 709.
107
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provide pensions. This result generated much controversy, with some
scholars suggesting: (1) that Title VII ought not extend to rational discrimination, and (2) that the court improperly determined discrimination based on the employee’s costs rather than the employee’s actual or
114
expected value or her subjective assessment of that value. The Supreme Court in Norris declined to accept either of these contentions,
expanding Manhart and establishing a now well-respected precedent.
Since the Supreme Court has foreclosed the avenue of pursuing
passive discrimination claims as disparate treatment in fringe benefits
or compensation, plaintiffs may try instead to construe passive discrimination as disparate treatment in hiring. In the absence of direct or
strong circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, courts would
draw no inference of intentional discrimination from the hiring practice
even if the employer would prefer to employ people drawn predominantly or even entirely from [a particular group]. Discrimination is not preference or aversion; it is acting on the preference or
aversion. If the most efficient method of hiring, adopted because it
is the most efficient . . . just happens to produce a work force whose
racial or religious or ethnic or national-origin or gender composi115
tion pleases the employer, this is not intentional discrimination.
For many of our hypotheticals, the fringe benefits package or method
116
of compensation is by definition most efficient for that employer.
Those that are not most efficient may still be defended under the employer’s weak burden to produce evidence of a legitimate business justification. Even if a smoking gun of discriminatory intent were present,
the defendant could still prevail if he showed that this hiring practice
117
would also have been adopted on the basis of efficiency justifications.

114 See George J. Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe
Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U Chi L Rev 489, 542 (1982) (arguing that accounting for mortality tables when organizing a pension plan ought not violate Title VII); Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A Revisionist View of Sex
Discrimination in Employment, Am Bar Found Res J 583, 624–31 (1981) (arguing that Manhart
failed to consider Title VII’s recognition of prevalent social norms of gender differences); Spencer
L. Kimball, Reverse Discrimination: Manhart, Am Bar Found Res J 83, 127 (1979) (suggesting
that Manhart be given the narrowest possible interpretation).
115 Equal Employment Opportunity Commision v Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d
233, 236 (7th Cir 1993). In Consolidated Service Systems, 73 percent of applicants and 81 percent
of hires at the Korean-owned company were Korean. At most 3 percent of the relevant work
force in the area was Korean. The EEOC declined to pursue its disparate impact claim on appeal. Id at 235–36.
116 For instance, the provision of free school tuition can be economically justified regardless
of whether the employer desires to induce segregation. It costs less for schools to provide tuition
than for employees to purchase such tuition on the open market.
117 Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 236:
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Easy disparate treatment cases include instances in which an employee offers a potential plaintiff a facially different wage than others
similarly situated. For example, an employer may offer to pay male
bus drivers $20 an hour and offer to pay equally qualified female bus
drivers $15 an hour. Similarly, the employer may offer Caucasian bus
drivers comprehensive health insurance and fail to offer AfricanAmerican drivers the same insurance package. Even if such a facially
discriminatory policy were designed to favor individuals within the
protected group, it would be impermissible. So, for example, an employer could not lawfully assign female bus drivers to daytime routes
and assign male bus drivers to nighttime routes under the rationale
that women might find the nighttime routes less safe or more difficult
to manage with child care responsibilities.
If, on the other hand, the employer offers all bus drivers lower wages
and higher pension benefits than other area employers, individual employees cannot successfully lodge a disparate treatment claim. Even if
empirical evidence indicates that, as a group, African-American drivers
are the least likely to draw from such a pension plan or that AfricanAmerican drivers have a higher discount rate and place a lower value
on such pensions, the employer has treated each individual black driver the same as all its other drivers. Courts look at objective treatment
from the employer’s perspective—not at subjective interpretation or
valuation of treatment from the employee’s perspective. So we contend no individual disparate treatment claim could succeed.
Under pattern-and-practice claims, however, if employers devised
a very successful sorting mechanism, plaintiffs might be able to satisfy
the prima facie showing of gross statistical disparity. For instance, in
118
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v United States, the Supreme
119
Court, sidestepping a debate over proper statistical analysis, suggested that the complete or very nearly complete absence of members
of a protected class in a particular job can compel an inference of dis120
crimination. Later courts have been “particularly dubious of attempts
121
by employers to explain away ‘the inexorable zero.’” Some have gone
so far as to suggest that “the 100% sex-segregated workforce is highly
[I]f, though the motives behind adoption of the [word-of-mouth hiring] method were a mixture of discrimination and efficiency, [the employer] would have adopted the identical method of recruitment even if he had no interest in the national origin of his employees, the
fact that he had such an interest would not be a “but for” cause of the discriminatory outcome and [ ] there would be no liability.
118

431 US 324 (1977).
Id at 335 n 15.
120 See id at 342 n 23. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Andrew
Corp, 1989 WL 32884, *14 (ND Ill).
121 Capaci v Katz & Besthoff, Inc, 711 F2d 647, 662 (5th Cir 1983).
119
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suspicious and is sometimes alone sufficient to support judgment for
122
the plaintiff.” So if the high pension, low wages strategy resulted in a
workforce with no or very few African-American drivers in a labor
pool with many qualified African-American drivers, employers may
face a Title VII problem. Yet despite judicial statements that mere
evidence of statistical disparity is sufficient to satisfy the prima facie
case, plaintiffs rarely prevail in such cases without testimony about
123
individual acts of discrimination. In fact, many circuits are diluting
the inference to be drawn from the inexorable zero, with some circuits
merging it “into statistical disparity analysis, focusing on the diagnostic
124
value of the zero in comparison to other forms of statistical analysis.”
Only if the employer foolishly allowed the discovery of direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, such as a memo that reads “our
workplace provides generous pension benefits because we wish to attract Caucasian workers and repel African-American workers,” will the
employer face real difficulty in providing nondiscriminatory explana125
tions for the gross disparity. Even then, the plaintiffs might not prevail. Such a memo would reveal race-based animus and an intent to
achieve a segregated workplace, but a plaintiff still bears the burden of
proving the occurrence of discrimination as defined by Title VII. As mentioned earlier, § 703(a) prohibits discrimination against “any individual”
because of such “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”
whereas here the employer has relied on preferences that tend to be
correlated with protected characteristics but has offered each individual
a package that is facially equal to the packages offered to all other job
126
candidates. Even though most or even all individuals with a protected

122

Loyd v Phillips Brothers, Inc, 25 F3d 518, 524 n 4 (7th Cir 1994).
For a view that statistics alone are not compelling, see Sears, 839 F2d at 360 (Cudahy
dissenting).
124 Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar Workplace: Toward a
Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U Mich J L Ref 447, 485 (2008). Circuit courts have split on
how to treat the inexorable zero; most treat it as rebuttable presumption that the employer
intended to exclude, while a minority require additional evidence to establish an inference of
discrimination. See id at 475.
125 Similarly, if employers purposely use commission-based salaries as a mechanism to screen
out women, then it will not qualify for Title VII’s exception for differential pay under “a merit
system or system which measures earnings by quantity or quality or production,” as the differences
would be “the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(h). See also 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 10-IV(F)(1) at 6729
(CCA 2003) (providing permissible examples such as paying word processors by the number of
documents produced and paying sales people on their volume of sales). If such screening occurred because employers used commission as a proxy for ambitious salespersons, then § 703(h)
permits it. Nonetheless, if, such screening is a result of discriminatory intent, but no direct evidence of such intent exists, the defendant is likely to prevail.
126 Compare 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1), with Teamsters, 431 US at 335 n 15:
123
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characteristic may subjectively value the package less than other individuals, the employer has relied on group-based preferences but has
left it to the individual to decide whether to accept the job and the
benefits package. Perhaps, though, a court faced with such direct evidence of discriminatory animus might analogize it to harassment cases
in which employer behavior, when sufficiently severe and pervasive, is
taken to constitute a change in the terms and conditions of employment
127
for the harassed individual. If the benefits package is constructed in
such a way as to discourage all or nearly all individuals with a protected
characteristic, perhaps a court would view that as the equivalent of offering a facially discriminatory benefits package.
Alternatively, courts might use such memos or other direct evidence of discriminatory intent to construe such employer efforts to
segregate as a hiring policy. For instance, in word-of-mouth hiring, a
practice that might be viewed as similar to what we term passive discrimination, an employer might ask or merely rely on employees to
provide applicants rather than use easily accessed advertisements or
filings with state employment agencies. When employers engage in
such behavior with the intent to create a segregated workforce, courts
have deemed such practices discriminatory; but conversely, when
companies merely allow this practice or no direct evidence of discri-

Disparate treatment such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
(emphasis added). Contrast our hypotheticals with the finding of the Court in Teamsters in which
“numerous qualified . . . applicants . . . either had their requests ignored, were given false or misleading information about requirements, opportunities, and application procedures, or were not considered and hired on the same basis that whites were considered and hired.” Id at 338.
127 See Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775, 786 (1998) (holding that Title VII encompasses more than formally different terms and conditions of employment and includes hostile work
environments that also alter the initial terms of the employment relationship). Even in harassment
cases, however, harassed workers are being treated differently than other individuals. If everyone is
subject to similarly unwelcome and severe or pervasive behavior, such harassment is not actionable.
See Malhotra v Cotter & Co, 885 F2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir 1989) (“A member of [a racial minority
group] has no right to a more congenial working environment than a white male, and therefore he
can complain only about harassment that is discriminatory in character or purpose.”).
Another possibility is that a court could use § 703(m) as a standalone provision. This provision states: “Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(m). This provision seems concerned with so-called mixed
motive cases but might also be interpreted to suggest that Title VII prohibits any employer practice motivated by a protected characteristic, including crafting compensation packages, even if
the practice results in facially neutral treatment.
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minatory intent exists, courts often find it unobjectionable, as it is
128
much cheaper than alternative hiring strategies.
So in some ways, passive discrimination looks like word-of-mouth
hiring in that it yields segregated workforces without forcing employers to reject disfavored applicants. In addition, in both word-of-mouth
hiring cases and in most of our hypotheticals, the employment practice
129
is by definition efficient for that employer. Thus, the defendant could
still avoid damages in either scenario if he showed that the particular
hiring practice would also have been adopted on the basis of efficien130
cy justifications. Yet in a meaningful sense, even tacit approval of
word-of-mouth hiring constitutes discrimination in a way that our hypotheticals do not. Word-of-mouth hiring excludes disfavored workers
from the applicant pool and thus from hiring opportunities. In passive
discrimination, however, all potential employees have equal access to
the applicant pool and are presented with identical opportunities. We
assume the employer is willing to and does make offers to disfavored
131
applicants in the hope that they will turn down the jobs.
The examples of passive discrimination raised in this Article gen132
erally do not fall under disparate treatment analysis. If employers rendered African-Americans ineligible for pension benefits, denied women
access to commission jobs, or prohibited only native Spanish speakers
from speaking Spanish at work, workers could raise viable claims under
133
the disparate treatment model. Title VII clearly prohibits employers
128 See, for example, Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 235–36 (7th Cir 1993). The
Seventh Circuit made clear that no inference of intentional discrimination could be drawn from
the mere existence of the word-of-mouth hiring practice. But see Andrew Corp, 1989 WL 32884
at *18 (holding that a word-of-mouth hiring system for clerical employees was discriminatory, as
its implementation, coupled with a work force from which minorities had been excluded, perpetuated an all-white work force).
129 For instance, the provision of free school tuition is economically justifiable regardless of
whether the employer desires to discriminate. The case still may reach the jury as the employer
must believe the economic rationale—she cannot merely refer to efficiency if it is not claimed to
have motivated her decisionmaking.
130 See Consolidated Service Systems, 989 F2d at 236. See also note 117.
131 We believe Title VII could capture cases in which the employer attempts to get workers
to self-sort but also refuses to hire those undesired workers who are willing to accept employment. Our hypotheticals presume a litigation-savvy employer who wishes both to comply with
Title VII and to have a segregated workforce.
132 Some sex discrimination cases, however, are more complicated, with some courts suggesting that the failure to cover contraceptives may count as disparate treatment and some academics further contending that the failure to cover infertility treatments may also be included.
133 Passive discrimination, as it occurs in the religious context, presents some distinct doctrinal questions as the text of Title VII contains two religious exemptions. First, the educational
programs exemption allows an educational institution to hire an employee within a specific religion,
if the institution is run by a particular religion or if the institution’s curriculum propagates a particular religion. 42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(2). This exemption covers all employees regardless of whether
their activities are intimately connected with the institution’s religious activities. By its terms, it
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from treating individuals differently because of discriminatory animus
or outmoded stereotypes or even seemingly rational group-based ste134
reotypes. Yet, as currently conceived, disparate treatment claims seemingly do not prohibit the employer from using group-based characteristics, preferences, or stereotypes to treat individuals similarly in hopes
that such treatment will encourage applicants from disfavored groups
to sort themselves out of a job based on their own preferences. As any
individual applicant may defy the stereotype and elect into the job, no
disparate treatment has occurred even if an employer succeeds in
achieving a segregated workplace. Such a construction of disparate
treatment claims fosters Title VII’s implied guarantee of equal opportunities, not equal outcomes.
B.

Disparate Impact

In contrast, disparate impact claims allow plaintiffs to prevail even
when they have not been treated differently than other employees and
135
lack direct proof of the intent to discriminate. First elucidated in
136
Griggs v Duke Power Co, a plaintiff can succeed if she identifies a
particular employment practice with a significant adverse impact on a
does not cover terms and conditions of employment as they relate to compensation. The other
exception allows religious corporations to discriminate in employment with respect to those
individuals who perform work connected with “the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.” 42 USC § 2000e-1(a). In determining the scope
of this exception, courts weigh “significant religious and secular characteristics . . . to determine
whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.” Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co, 859 F2d 610, 618 (9th Cir
1988). Legislative history of the § 702 amendment suggests judges should construe the exemption narrowly and courts tend to weigh for-profit status and secular output heavily against qualifying an organization as a religious corporation. See id at 618–19. So only a very narrow range of
employers may discriminate in hiring. For instance, Chick-fil-A would not qualify for such an
exemption. That being said, qualifying schools could simply refuse to hire outside the religion. If
such institutions do so in an effort to covertly rather than legally and overtly discriminate, attention to this disparity could force schools to be candid about their religious agenda.
134 Title VII also contains a bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ) defense in which
considering the sex, religion, or national origin of a potential employee is “reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(e)(1). Courts
construe the BFOQ exception narrowly. See, for example, Dothard, 433 US at 334 (stating that due
to the restrictive language of the statute, the relevant legislative history, and the interpretation of the
EEOC, the BFOQ exception should be an extremely narrow exception). In addition, the BFOQ
defense generally does not apply to terms and conditions of employment such as compensation
packages. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Fremont Christian School, 781 F2d
1362, 1366–67 (9th Cir 1986) (invalidating a discriminatory health insurance benefit plan that
awarded benefits premised on a religious belief that only men can be heads of households and
holding that the BFOQ exception “does not apply to the full range of possibly discriminatory employment actions”).
135 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L Rev 701,
782 (2006).
136 401 US 424 (1971).
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protected class and the defendant “fails to demonstrate that the challenged employment practice is job related for the position in question
137
and consistent with business necessity.” If the challenged practice sig138
nificantly serves the legitimate employment goals of the employer,
the plaintiff can still prevail if she can prove that a less discriminatory
139
alternative employment practice equally serves the defendants’ goals.
Passive discrimination seemingly fits better under a disparate impact
analysis, as employers devise facially neutral compensation packages
and other terms and conditions that may result in fewer individuals
from a disfavored group in a workplace than would otherwise exist in
the absence of such mechanisms.
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a facially
neutral employment practice has a significant adverse impact on a pro140
tected class. To use women as an example, a female plaintiff can make
such a showing through at least three different methods: (1) showing
the suspect employment practice excludes women in a specified geographical area at a substantially higher rate than men, (2) providing
evidence of the percentage of female applicants that are actually excluded by the practice, or (3) documenting the level of employment of
women by the employer in comparison with the percentage of women
141
in the relevant labor market or geographic area. For instance, if a restaurant required applicants to bench press one hundred pounds in order to be considered for a wait staff job, female plaintiffs could likely
142
use any of the methods above to demonstrate a disparate impact. The
137

42 USC § 2000e-2(k) (codifying the standard set out in Griggs, 401 US at 429–33).
See, for example, Watson v Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US 977, 998–99 (1988) (stating
that certain hiring practices, such as university tenure systems, may have a discriminatory impact,
but are still valid if they are legitimately related to a sufficient business purpose); New York City
Transit Authority v Beazer, 440 US 568, 587 n 31 (1979) (upholding a prohibition against hiring
current methadone users because the prohibition served the legitimate employment goals of
safety and efficiency).
139 See 42 USC § 2000e-2(k). See also Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 425 (1975)
(holding that if an employer meets the burden of proving that certain employment tests are jobrelated, the complaining party can still succeed if he can show that other selection devices, which
do not have a similarly undesirable effect, would serve the employer’s legitimate interests).
140 Albemarle, 422 US at 425.
141 See Chambers v Omaha Girls Club, 629 F Supp 925, 948 (D Neb 1986).
142 Many cases turn on what counts as the relevant comparison group. See, for example,
Caviale v State of Wisconsin, Department of Health & Social Services, 744 F2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir
1984) (overturning a district court ruling requiring the comparison pool to possess subjective
qualities and instead limiting the comparison pool to those that possess the “minimum objective
qualifications necessary”). Some circuits also require evidence of statistical significance to satisfy
the prima facie case. See, for example, Fudge v City of Providence Fire Department, 766 F2d 650,
658 (1st Cir 1985) (“[I]n cases involving a narrow data base, the better approach is for the courts
to require a showing that the disparity is statistically significant.”). The Seventh Circuit allows for
disparate impact so long as there is statistical significance even if the magnitude in difference in
selection rates is quite small. See Bew v City of Chicago, 252 F3d 891, 893 (7th Cir 2001) (agree138
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defendant would then have the opportunity to “demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and con143
sistent with business necessity.” To return to our example, the restaurant might contend that weightlifting is an effective proxy to assess
144
whether wait staff can carry trays stacked heavy with food and drinks.
Most importantly for our hypothetical employers, courts seem
145
amenable to cost-based justifications for employment practices. While
courts and scholars disagree over the contours of what constitutes “job
146
related and consistent with business necessity,” many defendants
ing with the district court’s finding of disparate impact for a test in which 98.24 percent of blacks
passed compared with 99.96 percent of whites). Some courts accept statistical evidence as well as
other forms of proof to demonstrate disparate impact. See Thomas v Metroflight, Inc, 814 F2d
1506, 1511 (10th Cir 1987) (holding that “statistical studies, evidence of experience in sufficiently
similar circumstances, expert testimony on decisionmaking in the context of [the potentially
discriminatory rule] or other evidence” can be used to prove disparate impact). Some courts also
require substantiality of impact in addition to statistical significance. See id at 1511 n 4 (discussing cases in which the disparity of the impact must be both substantial as well as statistically significant); Frazier v Garrison Independent School District, 980 F2d 1514, 1524 (5th Cir 1993) (stating
that statistical disparities alone, without a demonstration of the magnitude of the disparity, are
insufficient for satisfying a prima facie case of discrimination).
143 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(i). Congress formulated this text in response to Watson, in which a
defendant could satisfy this standard by producing “evidence that its employment practices are
based on legitimate business reasons,” see 487 US at 998, which Congress perceived as an overly
defendant-friendly interpretation. See HR Rep 102-40, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (1991), reprinted in 1991
USCCAN 549, 566–68. Congress, however, left this “job related and consistent with business necessity” standard ambiguous. Lower courts must still grapple with pre-1991 precedents that appear
to be in tension. For example, in cases like Beazer, in which the employer’s antimethadone policy
was challenged, the Court articulated a relatively lenient standard, suggesting the employer’s
legitimate goals need only be significantly served by their policy. See 440 US at 587 n 31. This was
weaker than the suggestion in Dothard, where the Court seemed to require that the policy directly measure a characteristic essential to job performance. See 433 US at 331–32.
144 The plaintiff might counter that the alternative employment practice of having applicants carry actual loaded trays is no more costly and as good or better at measuring the desired
characteristic as well as having a less disparate impact on women.
145 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Francis W. Parker School,
41 F3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir 1994) (stating that the school’s policy of linking compensation to experience was “an economically defensible and reasonable means of determining salaries”); Finnegan v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 967 F2d 1161, 1163–65 (7th Cir 1992) (strongly implying that
even if a disparate impact claim could be stated on a fringe benefits package, the cost savings
would constitute a business justification); Robinson v Lorillard Corp, 444 F2d 791, 799 n 8 (4th
Cir 1971) (stating that “considerations of economy and efficiency will often be relevant to determining the existence of business necessity [but] dollar cost alone is not determinative”); United States v South Carolina, 445 F Supp 1094, 1116 (D SC 1977) (stating that a policy that caused a
disparate impact survived the business necessity test inasmuch as there “appears to be no alternative available to the [employer] within reasonable limits of risk and cost”).
146 See, for example, Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 Cal L Rev 669, 671 (2007) (comparing arguments that the business necessity defense is only invalid when the employment policy
is “needless” with arguments that the defense is only valid if the policy is substantially necessary); Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases,
30 Ga L Rev 387, 387–88 (1996) (arguing that the business necessity defense should require that
the policy be essential to the continued viability of the business); Michael Carvin, Disparate
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prevail under this defense. If the practice is unusual and not spread
throughout the industry, an employer might face some difficulty showing the practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity,
but the threshold is relatively low. Moreover, many of our hypotheticals rely on the employers’ efficiency gain in providing particular benefits. Even so, some subset of hypothetical plaintiffs might prevail under disparate impact analysis if courts engage in such analysis.
The Supreme Court, however, has cast doubt as to whether fringe
benefits and compensation packages are subject to disparate impact
147
analysis. In Manhart, the pension case described above, the Court
stated in dicta:
The suggestion that a gender-neutral pension plan would itself
violate Title VII because of its disproportionately heavy impact
on male employees . . . has no force in the sex discrimination context because each retiree’s total pension benefits are ultimately
determined by his actual life span; any differential in benefits paid
to men and women in the aggregate is thus “based on [a] factor
other than sex” and consequently immune from challenge under
the Equal Pay Act. Even under Title VII itself—assuming disparate impact analysis applies to fringe benefits—the male employees would not prevail. Even a completely neutral practice will
inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one group or
another. Griggs does not imply and this Court has never held that
148
discrimination must always be inferred from such consequence.
This language poses several problems for passive discrimination
cases. The Manhart dicta might be read to suggest that judges may never
149
apply disparate impact analysis to wages or fringe benefits claims,
though another possible reading might merely indicate that disparate
impact analysis is only available to minorities and not to men, or that
Impact Claims under the New Title VII, 68 Notre Dame L Rev 1153, 1157–58 (1993) (arguing that
the language of the statute only requires that the policy be connected with or related to business
necessity, rather than an essential method or the best means, and that it is therefore not a particularly demanding standard).
147 Fringe benefits cases under disparate impact analysis have dealt with the exclusion of
particular benefits, such as contraceptives or fertility treatments, rather than the decision to
provide compensation in the form of fringe benefits. See, for example, Cooley v Daimler Chrysler
Corp, 281 F Supp 2d 979, 986 (ED Mo 2003) (holding that female employees established a prima
facie case of disparate impact due to the employer’s health plan not covering prescription contraceptives). In the case of fringe benefits, “the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for
jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.” Rose v Wells Fargo & Co,
902 F2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir 1990), citing Watson, 487 US at 994.
148 Manhart, 435 US at 710 n 20.
149 See Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, Disparate Impact in Compensation, and Other
Title VII Issues, 49 L & Contemp Probs 53, 54 (1986).

2009]

Passive Discrimination

837

where “disparate impact to one group results from avoiding disparate
150
treatment of another, the practice is justified by a business necessity.”
Likely as a result of this language, few cases have grappled with
compensation and fringe benefits under disparate impact analysis. In
151
Finnegan v Trans World Airlines, Inc, the Seventh Circuit held that
across-the-board cuts in fringe benefits, including reductions in vacation time and elimination of dental insurance, were not eligible for
152
disparate impact analysis under the ADEA. Judge Richard Posner
rejected even a prima facie case of disparate impact for “across-theboard cuts in wages and fringe benefits necessitated by business
downturns,” because “it would mean that every time an employer
made an across-the-board cut in wages or benefits he was prima facie
violating the age discrimination law. Practices so tenuously related to
discrimination, so remote from the objectives of civil rights law, do not
153
reach the prima facie threshold.” As Judge Posner explained,
The concept of disparate impact was developed for the purpose of
identifying discriminatory situations where, through inertia or insensitivity, companies were following policies that gratuitously—
needlessly—although not necessarily deliberately, excluded black or
female workers from equal employment opportunities . . . [whereas
154
the policies here] are an unavoidable response to adversity.
Finnegan is distinguishable from most of the passive discrimination
we discuss as it was both unintentional and was a response to economic
pressures, rather than being the original design of the compensation
package. It may also be distinguishable as an age case where compensation and benefits are very likely to be closely correlated with group
membership, whereas not all compensation and fringe benefits are likely to correlate with race or sex. Even so, Judge Posner emphasized the
importance of “exclusion” from opportunity. But, as discussed below,
passive discrimination does not exclude anyone from opportunity—it
just makes the opportunity less desirable.
Finnegan also raises another possible problem with including passive discrimination under disparate impact analysis. In dicta, Judge
Posner suggested that judges lack the institutional competence to “re155
design corporate compensation packages.” He observed that “virtually
150 Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White
Males, 98 Nw U L Rev 1505, 1530 (2004).
151 967 F2d 1161 (7th Cir 1992).
152 Id at 1163 (holding that “changes in compensation, made in response to business adversity” could not provide the basis of a disparate impact claim).
153 Id at 1164–65.
154 Id at 1164.
155 Finnegan, 967 F2d at 1165.
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all elements of a standard compensation package are positively corre156
lated with age” —similarly, as we noted in Part II, many preferences
regarding compensation may also be positively correlated with group
membership as defined by Title VII. Finally, Finnegan poses the problem
that remedying disparate impact on one group may raise the specter of
disparate treatment of another group. For instance, if women value
pension policies more highly than men as they are likely to live longer,
and if men could bring disparate impact claims, the court cannot remedy
such violations by ordering the women to pay more into the insurance
policy or to receive less pay. Given these arguments, disparate impact
analysis may not be an applicable tool to redress passive discrimination.
C.

The Lack of Interest Defense
157

The so-called “lack of interest defense,” available in both dispa158
rate treatment and disparate impact cases, is particularly relevant to
the causation questions raised in potential passive discrimination cases.
Lack of interest is a nondiscriminatory explanation for statistical dis159
160
parities and may be used to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
Under this “defense,” employers dispute the causal chain by showing
that employees’ voluntary choices, rather than particular employment
practices, cause workplace inequality or segregation. For example, in

156

Id at 1164.
Many refer to the “lack of interest defense,” though defendants often deploy this argument not as a formal affirmative defense, but, as mentioned in the text, as a way to rebut the
inference of causation raised by statistical disparity.
158 Courts have recognized the lack of interest defense as available even in pattern-andpractice cases that rely on the inexorable zero. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v
O & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Co, 38 F3d 872, 874 (7th Cir 1994), the EEOC sued a
manufacturer for its failure to hire African-Americans. The trial court found that the inexorable
zero in the company’s hiring decisions supported a prima facie case of hiring discrimination. The
company argued that the lack of African-American hires could be explained by AfricanAmericans’ lack of interest in working in a place where Polish or Spanish was spoken. The appellate
court rejected this formulation of the lack of interest argument, noting that such evidence would be
relevant only if “African-Americans exhibited this propensity in significantly greater proportion to
other native-born English speakers.” Id at 877. Only then could an employer defend an argument of
self-selection bias on the part of African-Americans. Yet in our hypotheticals, the employer could
argue in his defense that the individuals within the group do in fact exhibit the propensity that
causes them to self-sort.
159 See, for example, Sears, 839 F2d at 313 (allowing the defendant to use a variety of evidence, including external labor force data, national survey data, and data from surveys of store
employees, to demonstrate that women are less interested in commission sales positions, thus rebutting the presumption of discrimination given the disparities in hiring demonstrated by the EEOC’s
statistical evidence). See also Catlett v Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, 828 F2d
1260, 1266 (8th Cir 1987) (explaining that the highway commission had not provided adequate
evidence demonstrating that women have a lack of interest in highway maintenance work sufficient to rebut the statistical disparities in the hiring of women).
160 See Teamsters, 431 US at 360 n 46.
157
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Sears, the EEOC claimed that Sears “engaged in a nationwide pattern
or practice of discrimination against women . . . by failing to hire and
promote females into commission sales positions on the same basis as
161
males.” Although the EEOC presented statistical evidence that Sears
was significantly less likely to hire female applicants than male applicants for commission sales, Sears rebutted the inference of discrimination by suggesting that female applicants themselves lacked interest in
commission sales. The district court agreed and found that the company
had merely honored the preexisting employment preferences of work162
ing women themselves. The appellate court accepted the reasons for
women’s lack of interest in commission sales job, including “a fear or
dislike of what they perceived as cut-throat competition, and increased
163
pressure and risk associated with commission sales.” If the employer
succeeds in showing that individual preference rather than a specific
employment practice causes a disparate impact, then it need not even
reach the question of whether the employment practice is job-related
164
and consistent with business necessity. In addition, if the defendant
need not reach this question, the plaintiffs lose the opportunity to prove
that an equally effective, but less discriminatory, alternate employment
165
practice should be utilized instead.
This lack of interest argument has been successful in both disparate
166
treatment and disparate impact cases. Scholars have already recognized
the problem the lack of interest doctrine poses for the structure of the
161

839 F2d at 307.
Sears, 628 F Supp at 1324–25. See also Vicki Schultz and Stephen Patterson, Race, Gender,
Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging
Job Segregation, 59 U Chi L Rev 1073, 1077–78 (1992) (arguing that the validity of the lack of
interest defense relied upon in Sears depends on the claim that women’s aversion to the position
arose from social or cultural forces beyond the employer’s control).
163 Sears, 839 F2d at 320. The dissent criticized the majority for accepting such stereotypes,
suggesting that something other than lack of interest must explain the statistical disparities:
162

Women, as described by Sears, the district court, and the majority, exhibit the very same stereotypical qualities for which they have been assigned low-status positions throughout history. . . . The stereotype of women as less greedy and daring than men is one that the sex
discrimination laws were intended to address. . . . There are abundant indications that women
lack neither the desire to compete strenuously for financial gain nor the capacity to take risks.
Id at 361 (Cudahy dissenting). Interestingly, the EEOC brought the case as a disparate treatment
case, rather than as a disparate impact case. This allowed the defendants to make the argument
that the very structure of pay was the reason so few women ended up in commission sales.
164 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii).
165 So, for example, if plaintiffs can show that a menu of compensation strategies would
maintain the same level of sales while excluding fewer women, then the plaintiff can force the
defendant to adopt such a practice. The lack of interest argument forecloses this path.
166 Some view it as part of a larger counterrevolution in employment discrimination law
that reflects judges’ belief “that discrimination is not prevalent in today’s workplace.” Ann
McGinley, !Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 Cornell J L &
Pub Policy 415, 471 (2000).
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167

labor process and for organizational form. Vicki Schultz and Stephen
Patterson suggest that courts often “credit the lack of interest defense
in sex discrimination cases,” as they “have assumed that women’s work
aspirations and identities are shaped exclusively through early socialization or even innate predispositions, rather than in response to labor
168
market conditions.” Over time, courts have also “begun to rationalize
racial inequality in employment as the reflection of racial differences in
169
work preferences that are not rooted in larger labor market conditions.”
While Schultz and Patterson suggest that many work-related preferences are endogenous to the labor market, it may also be that employers
intentionally or unintentionally act upon those compensation and fringe
benefits preferences that are exogenous to the labor market. This Article suggests that labor market conditions that shape women’s and other minorities’ interests in particular jobs may include not only the mere
job descriptions and duties, but also the terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment and the structure of compensation. Yet employers and
courts seem to, with few exceptions, view these packages as within the
employers’ discretion to design and the employees’ discretion to take or
leave. Passive discrimination suggests that courts’ acceptance of such
preferences under the lack of interest doctrine may open the door for
the employer to use such preferences with impunity.
D. Nondoctrinal Limits on Title VII
As discussed, many forms of passive discrimination escape both
existing disparate impact and disparate treatment models. Even if
courts recognized passive discrimination as actionable under Title VII
and plaintiffs could satisfy the prima facie case, defendants seem likely
to use lack of interest to prevent recovery. We further observe that
should courts revisit and expand these doctrines, other barriers endemic to Title VII provide substantial hurdles for passive discrimination suits. This Part briefly overviews the substantial limits to a litiga-

167 Mark Gould, Law and Philosophy: Some Consequences for the Law Deriving from the
Sociological Reconstruction of Philosophical Theory, 17 Cardozo L Rev 1239, 1357 (1996):

[A]n organizational form may have a disparate impact on economically homogenous black
and white workers, and when it does, that organizational form should be subject to legal sanction. Disparate impact theory should not only be reinstated as a check on facially neutral
hiring practices that actually discriminate, it should be extended to include facially neutral
organizational forms that discriminate.
But see Neil Dishman, Defending the Lack of Interest Defense: Why Title VII Should Recognize
Differing Job Interests between the Sexes, 14 Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J 189, 214–15 (2004).
168 Schultz and Patterson, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1081 (cited in note 162).
169 Id at 1082.
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tion-based strategy in: (1) perceiving discrimination, (2) reporting discrimination, and (3) winning suits.
1. Perceiving discrimination.
Many people fail even to recognize employment discrimination
because few members of disfavored groups consciously acknowledge
170
“the illegitimacy of their disadvantaged position in the status system.”
Many individuals resist recognizing the existence of pervasively unfair
group-based outcomes, as doing so would challenge the widely held and
deep-seated belief that the world is just and that outcomes are based on
171
personal control, meritocracies, and fairness. That being said, some
individuals reject the belief in a just world and may instead accurately
perceive discrimination or even see discrimination where either none
exists or it is not legally cognizable. Some theorists contend that
members of low-status groups may be more susceptible to this vigil172
ance bias “because of their more frequent encounters with prejudice.”
Limited empirical evidence, however, suggests that the tendency among
individuals to overlook or minimize discrimination (“minimization
173
bias”) is more prevalent than the vigilance bias.
Even for those individuals who perceive workplace discrimination, passive discrimination is particularly likely to be invisible. Recent
studies suggest that those workers who feel discriminated against tend
to identify the source as either harassing behavior or subjective deci174
sionmaking systems that result in a wage differential. For instance,
self-reporting studies show that individuals complain most about being passed over for promotion, being assigned undesirable tasks, and
175
hearing racist comments. The form of discrimination outlined in this
Article, however, facially treats employees the same. While individuals
within protected classes may place different values on the compensation packages, employers do not formally exclude individuals from

170 Cheryl R. Kaiser and Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving
and Reporting Discrimination, 31 L & Soc Inquiry 801, 804 (2006).
171 Id at 804–06 (reviewing a number of studies supporting the proposition that people
often do not see or minimize discrimination when it is directed at them).
172 Brenda Major, et al, Perceiving Personal Discrimination: The Role of Group Status and
Legitimizing Ideology, 82 J Personality & Soc Psych 269, 270, 280 (2002).
173 See id at 270. See also Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 Colum L Rev
1093, 1142 (2008) (suggesting that the weight of empirical evidence is in favor of the minimization bias, and that the tendency is to underestimate discrimination).
174 Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII As a Tool for Institutional
Reform, 72 Fordham L Rev 659, 683–87 (2003).
175 K.A. Dixon, Duke Storen, and Carl E. Van Horn, A Workplace Divided: How Americans View
Discrimination and Race on the Job 14 (Rutgers, Jan 2002), online at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/
uploadedFiles/Publications/Work_Trends_020107.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009).
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these terms. Potential plaintiffs have a difficult enough time recognizing disparate treatment in hiring, much less identifying the ways in
which facially neutral wage structures and fringe benefit packages
176
have been organized in order to encourage them to opt out of it.
Passive discrimination may successfully encourage potential employees to sort themselves out of jobs, but those individuals seem
much more likely to view such sorting as evidence of personal agency
and control rather than perceiving it as discriminatory. This is particularly true when employers act like our hypothesized litigation-savvy
employers who engage in no other discriminatory behavior.
Much of the potential discrimination discussed in this Article is
quite subtle and can remain invisible as part of the established status
quo. For example, despite the fact that insurance plans have long failed
to cover contraceptives, women did not begin challenging this coverage
177
gap until 2000. Similarly, individuals seem unlikely to perceive generous pension packages, Sundays off, free tuition, or commission-based
wages as discriminatory rather than part of the established workplace
and the existing world. That being said, individuals have challenged
English-only workplaces—perhaps because these policies seem to
more clearly exclude some employees (who cannot speak English or
desire to speak a second language) or because they often reflect a
change in the employers’ policies, which had previously allowed other
178
languages. So, the perception barrier is not an insurmountable one,
but it suggests cutting-edge litigation may be slow in coming.
2. Reporting discrimination.
For whatever small percentage of applicants and employees who
do perceive discrimination, even fewer individuals act upon such intuitions to pursue litigation or other remedies. As we posit, passive discrimination presumably dissuades many individuals from even accepting employment. The employer has not refused to offer them em-

176 See Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, The Q-word As Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact
Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 Tex L Rev 1487, 1492 (1996) (discussing how the use
of subjective hiring standards and the requirement that hiring statistics be based on the qualified
population in the relevant job market has made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to recognize
or prove that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred).
177 As Kathryn Kolbert, cofounder of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy noted,
“[The exclusion of contraceptive coverage] is a problem that is so obvious it got hidden. Because
women were denied coverage for so long, no one ever questioned it.” Debra Baker, Viagra
Spawns Birth Control Issue: Advocates Invoke Bias Laws in Urging Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, 84 ABA J 36, 36 (Aug 1998) (reporting an interview with Kathryn Kolbert).
178 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Premier Operator Services, Inc, 113 F Supp 2d 1066, 1073 (ND Tex 2000) (holding that an employer’s blanket prohibition on
the speaking of a language other than English on the employer’s premises violated Title VII).
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ployment but, rather, has selected terms and conditions of employment that make the job less desirable to individuals of particular protected classes. If such discrimination poses a cognizable claim and the
individuals perceive it as such, they could choose to file directly with
the EEOC. Many potential plaintiffs, however, lack the resources to
179
pursue a claim, and many of those who are hunting for jobs seem
especially vulnerable in this respect. Such resource constraints may
explain why plaintiffs are also less likely to pursue disparate impact
claims, which, unlike disparate treatment claims, do not provide for
180
damages. Most disparate impact cases tend to deal with employment
181
tests, with few novel claims advanced.
For those individuals who wish to challenge these terms and conditions after they have already been employed, most must use internal
grievance mechanisms before they can file a complaint with the EEOC.
So those few who are not “efficiently” sorted out of the segregated
workplace will have to take any ensuing dispute to the internal grievance system. These internal mechanisms tend to construe problems as
182
misunderstandings rather than as legal grievances. Not surprisingly,
for those individuals already in an employment situation, most decide
183
not to seek either internal or external remedies.

179

See Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National
Survey, 141–42, 262 (American Bar Foundation 1977) (reporting that people facing job discrimination problems are the least likely to have access to available resources, such as government
agencies, and have the lowest rate of lawyer use). Some evidence also suggests that employees
may be less likely to file suit in periods of economic strength. See, for example, John J. Donohue
and Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the
Business Cycle, 66 S Cal L Rev 709, 710 (1993) (suggesting that in times of prosperity, potential
litigants are more likely to bypass their legal remedies when new jobs and market opportunities
are available).
180 See 42 USC § 1981a(a)(1) (providing for compensatory and punitive damages in intentional discrimination cases). That being said, Michael Selmi suggests that “many of the recent
large class action claims have proceeded under an intentional discrimination theory, even though
many of their core allegations sound in traditional disparate impact language.” Selmi, 53 UCLA
L Rev at 735 n 142 (cited in note 135).
181 Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 742–43 (cited in note 135).
182 See Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, and Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity
of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures As Rational Myth, 105 Am J Sociology 406, 449 (1999)
(discussing the manner in which internal grievance systems approach claims as managerial problems, rather than as an issue of the legal rights of the employee).
183 Kaiser, 31 L & Soc Inquiry at 813–14 (cited in note 170). A Rutgers study suggests that
about 34 percent of those believing they suffered unfair treatment did nothing, with at best
3 percent initiating a lawsuit. See Dixon, A Workplace Divided at 15 (cited in note 175).
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3. Winning suits.
Of all discrimination cases brought to the EEOC, plaintiffs re184
ceive favorable decisions in only 28 percent of the claims. Of those
victorious in lower courts, many employment discrimination plaintiffs
have their victories overturned at the appellate level, while defendants
185
are likely to preserve their lower court victories. Of all employment
discrimination plaintiffs, those claiming either race or sex discrimina186
tion (excepting harassment cases) fare particularly badly. Victims
187
hardly fare better in internal complaint systems.
In disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, plaintiffs are
188
both far more likely to file and to win firing cases than hiring cases.
Firing, rather than hiring, cases are more common because in disparate impact firing claims “the relevant pools exist within the firm (a
greater fraction of black than white employees were terminated),
whereas in a hiring case great debate concerns the appropriate deter189
mination of the qualified applicant pool.” These disparate impact
cases are generally difficult to win—in 2002, only 13 percent of plain190
tiffs prevailed at the district court level with disparate impact claims.
Several factors might explain such poor results as compared to
191
most civil litigation. Judges and juries “may falsely assume that mem184

See Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, in Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, eds, Handbook of Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities 3, 31 (Springer 2005) (reporting
that of all the favorable decisions, 99 percent are from EEOC action and settlement and 1 percent
from litigated trial victory).
185 See Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart Schwab, How Employmentdiscrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 Empl Rts & Empl Policy J 547,
552 (2003) (finding that despite the fact that plaintiffs appeal at a rate fifteen times greater than
defendants, plaintiffs obtain one-quarter the number of reversals that defendants do).
186 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveal Low Success Rates for
Women and Minorities, 37 UC Davis L Rev 511, 516–17 (2003) (analyzing jury verdicts in California
employment law cases and concluding that judicial and juror bias substantially disadvantages
women and minorities in employment discrimination cases).
187 See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger, and John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution:
The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L & Socy Rev 497, 529–30 (1993).
188 See John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 1015 (1991) (analyzing the increased use of antidiscrimination suits to protect the existing positions of workers, rather than to open employment
opportunities for disadvantaged groups); Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 739 (cited in note 135).
189 Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De
Geest, eds, 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 583 (Edward Elgar 2000). See also, for example, Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, 490 US 642, 650–51 (1989).
190 Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 739 (cited in note 135).
191 That being said, many employment discrimination suits settle, and the number may be
higher than most data reflects, as increasing numbers of invisible settlements are not recorded in
the docket. Nonetheless, employment discrimination suits settle at a substantially lower rate than
other types of civil actions. See Eric Conn, Note, Hanging in the Balance: Confidentiality Clauses
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bers of a protected class err on the side of vigilance.” They overlook or
underestimate “the significant social costs entailed in bringing a dis193
crimination claim.” If a single person or a few individuals bring the
action, judges and juries may “wonder why other group members have
not stepped forward to bring similar charges against the employer” and
194
presume those who brought the suit are troublemakers. David Oppenheimer suggests that “jury pools, already affected by race and gender bias, are being unduly influenced by incorrect information about the
civil justice system and employment discrimination law” such as the
195
misperception that minorities are routinely winning meritless cases.
Similarly, Michael Selmi contends that most judges believe the “role
discrimination plays in contemporary America has been sharply diminished, and those who take this view are reluctant to find discrimina196
tion absent compelling evidence.” This empirical evidence suggests
that even if existing doctrine prohibits passive discrimination, plaintiffs are unlikely to successfully combat it through litigation.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Article fits within a larger debate about the appropriate
framework with which to address workplace discrimination and segregation. Even for those generally sanguine about the market’s ability to
price out discrimination, a perfectly functioning market will not eliminate the problems identified in this Article. As discussed in Part I, intentional passive discriminators, unlike less savvy market actors, can
achieve a segregating equilibrium. Even those employers that possess
no discriminatory animus and respond rationally to market pressure

and Postjudgment Settlements of Employment Discrimination Disputes, 86 Va L Rev 1537, 1538 n 6
(2000) (comparing the tort settlement rate of 74 percent and the employment discrimination
settlement rate ranging from 61.3 percent to 67.7 percent). There has been no significant increase
in reported settlements after the statutory amendments to Title VII that took place in 1991. See
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 La L Rev 555,
570 n 58 (2001). See also generally Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 NC L Rev 927, 929 (2006) (arguing that confidential settlement agreements make employment discrimination invisible and reduce the deterrent effect of discrimination statutes).
While the number of settlements might mean the data fails to pick up some remedies, such settlements further stoke judges’ beliefs that “most plaintiffs are whiners and complainers” as the
favorable outcomes “are shielded from judicial imprimatur.” Id at 932.
192 Kaiser, 31 L & Soc Inquiry at 824 (cited in note 170).
193 Id.
194 Id at 824–25.
195 Oppenheimer, 37 UC Davis L Rev at 562 (cited in note 186). See also Selmi, 61 La L
Rev at 557 (cited in note 191) (decrying the general consensus that employment discrimination
cases are all too easy to win, which the author argues is fueled by popular books dramatizing the
damage done by employment discrimination suits).
196 Selmi, 61 La L Rev at 563 (cited in note 191).
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to eliminate irrational and inefficient discrimination face little incen197
tive to eliminate unintentional passive discrimination.
If one were concerned about either the workplace segregation
created by passive discrimination or the disregard for group-based preferences for particular compensation structures and fringe benefits,
some judicial and legislative actions might be taken to reduce these
198
phenomena. Title VII reform provides one obvious approach. That
being said, scholars disagree as to whether Title VII can effectively address the organizational structures and workplace norms that foster
199
discriminatory outcomes and segregated workplaces. Some contend
200
that Title VII has made major gains and with a little guidance can con201
tinue to do so in new contexts. As discussed in Part III, however, much
social psychology literature suggests that reliance on individual claimants to recognize, report, and litigate discrimination has significant
202
limitations. While Title VII has certainly caused many businesses to
be increasingly careful about their hiring and firing practices, scholars
have not resolved the degree to which Title VII should be credited
with reducing workplace discrimination and changing public opinion
in favor of integrated workplaces.
Rather than attempt to resolve this debate, we merely suggest
possible solutions within Title VII’s litigation-based framework as well
197 See Green, 72 Fordham L Rev at 673 (cited in note 174) (noting that the “entrenched,
taken-for-granted nature of institutionally enabled discrimination renders it particularly resistant
to market-induced reform”).
198 Of course, no such changes might be needed if cases of intentional passive discrimination are rare or adequately captured by pattern-and-practice claims and one is unconcerned with
both unintentionally induced workplace segregation and group-based differences in perceived or
actual compensation and fringe benefits so long as no individual discrimination exists. As explained in Part I, in a perfect market, self-sorting inflicts no economic harm on either Deltas or
Omegas. In an imperfect market, however, individuals in the group with the disfavored preference may have to choose between a job with benefits that they do not value as highly as other
employees or an otherwise less desirable job.
199 See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 Wash & Lee L Rev 3, 7–8 nn 15–16 (2005) (detailing numerous articles that
criticize the impact of antidiscrimination law and numerous articles that suggest future uses of
employment discrimination law to restructure the workplace).
200 See, for example, James J. Heckman and Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 Am
Econ Rev 138, 173–74 (1989) (concluding that federal antidiscrimination policy was responsible for
the increased employment and higher relative wages for blacks in the South Carolina manufacturing industry).
201 See Michael Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 575, 603 (2003) (“A
mini–Civil Rights Movement in the courts—undertaking more systemic cases and using expertise to help draw the inference of discrimination—may prove useful for developing a more empathetic federal judiciary.”).
202 See, for example, Kaiser and Major, 31 L & Soc Inquiry at 824 (cited in note 170) (discussing the cognitive and motivational barriers that hamper individual litigants from effectively
using the legal system to pursue antidiscrimination claims).
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as present some more innovative approaches. These options include
standalone legislation, education initiatives, and incentivized employer
restructuring. We offer preliminary suggestions but do so cognizant of
the risks of unexpected and perverse outcomes. We encourage other
scholars to think systematically about the prevention of and possible
remedies for passive discrimination.
A. Litigation Strategies
1. Title VII expansion.
One possible strategy, favored in other contexts by many legal academics, involves the legislative or judicial expansion of disparate impact
203
litigation. To begin with, courts could apply disparate impact doctrine
to the structure of compensation and to the provision of fringe benefits.
In so doing, they would need to clarify the dicta in Manhart and narrowly construe or abandon the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Finnegan as
applied to Title VII. When evaluating compensation packages and other
fringe benefits, they would have to decide the role of statistics and subjectivity in determining how to value the packages and when different
group valuations rise to the level of disparate impact. As mentioned
above, such assessments can be difficult for courts, but they already do
much statistical work in assessing conventional disparate impact and
pattern-and-practice claims. Such expansion would address both intentional and unintentional passive discrimination cases.
As briefly mentioned above, the judiciary may greet attempts to
expand the scope of disparate impact suits or to limit the potential defenses with skepticism and hostility. Courts have tended to interpret
204
205
Title VII in a stingy manner, have been reluctant to expand Title VII,
and in recent years have retrenched as to “what constitutes an actiona206
ble employment discrimination claim.” They have resisted efforts to

203 See, for example, Selmi, 53 UCLA L Rev at 704 n 12 (cited in note 135) (listing numerous
articles proposing such reforms); Charles Sullivan, Re-reviving Disparate Impact *59–60 (Seton Hall
Public Law Research Paper No 9, Aug 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=581503 (visited Apr 14,
2009); Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation As a Claiming System, 2005 Wis L Rev 663, 708 (arguing that expanding the application of disparate impact theories could significantly reduce employment inequality).
204 See Zimmer, 34 Colum Hum Rts L Rev at 586–93 (cited in note 201) (concluding after a
review of cases and academic studies that judges are inherently unsympathetic to discrimination cases); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala L Rev 741, 789
(2005) (arguing that plaintiffs face strong judicial resistance to a finding of illegal discrimination).
205 See Sullivan, 98 Nw U L Rev at 1565 (cited in note 150) (discussing judicial doctrines
that have limited, rather than expanded, the scope of Title VII).
206 Nielsen, 2005 Wis L Rev at 673 (cited in note 203).
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characterize default arrangements and organizational structures as
207
particular employment practices open to challenge.
The possibility of judicial backlash or legislative rollback is even
more worrisome than the mere prospect of judicial hostility. Attempts
to expand Title VII to cover heterogeneous preferences or to narrow
disparate impact defenses could simultaneously encourage courts to
restrict Title VII through other means such as raising the standards for
statistical evidence, or making prima facie claims harder to establish.
Such a strategy of giving in on substance and taking away on procedure may ultimately hurt more than it helps. Similarly, congressional
208
expansion of Title VII may facilitate a legislative rollback. Just as
courts can undo protections when faced with litigation they view with
a skeptical eye, Congress can do even more by changing the actual
209
text of Title VII. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a
210
mixed set of pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant policies.
Even so, allowing disparate impact suits in this area may yield
some benefits. In addition to the prospect of successful plaintiffs (either
through litigated triumphs or settlements), merely forcing workplaces
to elucidate a business necessity justification may itself change some
211
exclusionary practices. Making compensation and fringe benefits susceptible to disparate impact analysis might denaturalize these practices,
212
which itself may encourage voluntary change. So those risk-averse employers who unintentionally engage in passive discrimination and those
who face low costs in changing the policies may do so once made aware
of the practices’ potential illegality. Litigation and doctrinal adjustments
may also influence front-end behavior for new employers or those independently considering new compensation and fringe benefit packages.
207

Travis, 62 Wash & Lee L Rev at 39–40 (cited in note 199).
See Bernice Sandler, Publicly-supported Single Sex Schools and Policy Issues, 14 NY L
Sch J Hum Rts 61, 66 (1997) (arguing that experience has demonstrated that opening any controversial statute for amendment often leads to restrictions in the statute’s impact). Consider
also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 Wayne L Rev 1093, 1101–06 (1993) (discussing the consequences of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which significantly
amended Title VII, and its effects on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
209 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, codified as amended at 42
USC § 2000e et seq.
210 By opening up Title VII, proponents were able to undo some of the defendant-friendly,
post-Griggs litigation but also allowed the addition of some pro-defendant changes. Similarly,
revisiting Title VII to debate the scope of disparate impact litigation could allow other amendments that could be net losers for plaintiffs. See note 208.
211 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 135–36, 178–79
(Random House 2007) (discussing the power of the business justification rule in propelling “reasonforcing” conversations regarding policies that may have a discriminatory impact on certain groups).
212 See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L
283, 375 (2003) (discussing the feminist interest in denaturalizing workplace structures).
208
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2. Standalone legislation.
As individual compensation packages and other terms and conditions of employment become more salient, interest groups may instead push for standalone legislation to address particular mechanisms
of passive discrimination. Such an approach avoids the pitfalls of
213
opening up Title VII to amendment. Independent legislation may also
bypass some of the litigation hurdles associated with Title VII if it
does not primarily rely on individual claimants for enforcement. Of
course, this sort of case-by-case approach fails to provide comprehensive protection against a determined employer.
For instance, one piece of model legislation which might be taken
214
as a response to passive discrimination, the Equity in Prescription
Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), targeted insur215
ance providers rather than employers. The bill “require[d] all private
insurance plans that provide prescription drug coverage to include pre216
scription contraceptive coverage.” As Congress allowed this bill to
languish for several years, state-by-state legislation may present a
more viable option. So far, at least thirty-three states have regulated
insurance coverage relating to contraceptives either by requiring policies that cover prescription drugs to also cover contraceptives or by
prohibiting health plans from excluding contraceptive services or sup217
plies. One such state, Illinois, has also undertaken an awareness cam218
paign to educate the public about mandatory contraceptive coverage.
When fringe benefits or compensation packages are facially neutral but
exclude something of high value to most individuals within a particular
group, legislative intervention can remedy such exclusion.
213 For instance, concern about legislative rollback is one reason advocates drafted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) rather than amend Title VII. See Brian K. Esser, Comment, Beyond
43 Million: The “Regarded As” Prong of the ADA and HIV Infection—A Tautological Approach, 49
Am U L Rev 471, 476 (2000); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv CR–CL L Rev 413, 429 (1991).
214 This is not a perfect fit as the lack of contraceptive coverage seems an unlikely mechanism to exclude either women or nonreligious employees from a particular employer or from the
general workforce. It is a good example, however, of a policy relating to fringe benefits where
employers may simply have not considered women’s interests.
215 See S 104, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec S 97 (Jan 22, 2001); HR 1111, 107th
Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec H 1010 (Mar 20, 2001).
216 National Women’s Law Center, Contraceptive Coverage: A Multi-track Approach 2 (May
2008), online at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/Contraceptive%20Coverage%20MultiTrack%20Approach%
20May%20200.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009).
217 See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, State Mandated Benefits: Contraceptives, As of
August 1, 2007, online at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=487&cat=10&print=1
(visited Apr 14, 2009) (listing the states that mandate that insurance providers cover contraceptives).
218 See Planned Parenthood Action Illinois, Planned Parenthood, Governor Blagojevich Announce Contraceptive Insurance Awareness Campaign (2004), online at http://www.ppaction.org/
ppil/pp_gov_mktg.html (visited Apr 14, 2009).
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Other issues relating to terms and conditions of employment and
compensation packages that are identified in this Article seem more
219
resistant to tailored legislative fixes. If only a few employers engage
in particular screening behavior, interest groups may not prioritize
addressing such behavior since it will only directly affect a limited
number of individuals. In addition, some of the mechanisms of passive
discrimination provide a benefit that many individuals highly value
(though not those sorted out), rather than deny a benefit that few value very highly (while those that are sorted out do not). Other mechanisms provide a benefit that is highly valued by a small number of individuals, but given their intense preferences, those individuals would
strenuously oppose any legislation to eliminate the benefit. For instance, interest groups seem extremely unlikely to muster the political
220
will to eliminate “Sundays off” policies.
The ultimate success of either Title VII expansion or standalone legislation may depend on the reasons for the underlying discrimination. If
employers sort out individuals with a protected characteristic because of
inadvertence or expense, blanket prohibitions should be satisfactory in
eliminating the exclusionary practice. Such action would bring the behavior to the employers’ attention and raise the specter of litigation
costs. On the other hand, if employers use compensation and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment as a sophisticated mechanism for intentional discrimination or as a proxy for some other desired characteristic, then targeted litigation and legislative approaches
may just encourage employers to devise a new sorting mechanism. For
instance, some employers might have used tests and college degrees as
an imperfect proxy to screen out African-Americans in the 1960s and
1970s. The advent of disparate impact legislation means that similarly
animus-laden employers may now use low-wage, high-pension strategies to screen out African-Americans. If passive discrimination is sanctionable behavior, determined employers may seek another imperfect

219 For instance, language policies may pose serious challenges to an easy legislative fix.
Many of those most affected by “English-only” policies lack legislative clout and many states
face pressure from English-only movements. That being said, at least one state (California) has
prohibited English-only policies under state fair employment and housing department regulations as well as through statewide legislation. See Cal Gov Code § 12951 (West).
220 Even if such a constituency existed, such a policy would raise serious religious accommodation issues for employers, and many states still have blue laws prohibiting the operation of particular businesses on Sundays. See McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420, 444–52 (1961) (holding that
Maryland’s blue laws promote the secular values of “health, safety, recreation, and general wellbeing” and thus violate neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause); Maarten
Goos, Sinking the Blues: The Impact of Shop Closing Hours on Labor and Product Markets *2
(CEP Discussion Paper No 664, Dec 2004), online at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0664.pdf
(visited Apr 14, 2009) (noting that as of 1997, at least eight states still had Sunday closing laws).
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221

but legal screening strategy. Of course, even forcing them to abandon
the existing approach and to find a new, litigation-proof approach raises
the employers’ costs.
B.

Nonlitigation Strategies

In addition to legal efforts, nonlegal and voluntary strategies might
also help address problems raised by passive discrimination. They might
serve either as a complement to legal sanctions or as an alternate option
if legal sanctions are unavailable. We briefly discuss education-based
strategies as well as various methods to incentivize employers to change
their behavior. Yet some of the most effective remedies we consider
raise other problems and unintended consequences that warrant serious consideration.
1. Raising awareness.
If courts and legislatures fail to reach the question of when fringe
benefits and other compensation structures are subject to challenge
under disparate impact analysis, the EEOC could issue nonbinding advisory guidelines on the subject. These guidelines could identify areas in
which existing employer behavior to screen for a particular characteristic
or longstanding wage and compensation structures disadvantage particular groups. In so doing, the EEOC might suggest alternative, clearly
compliant structures, such as those discussed below. By merely raising
the issue, unintentional passive discriminators could be alerted to the
effects of their practices. If inadvertent or unconscious bias drives most
of these practices, simple education might go a long way. As Professor
Tristin Green notes, “[S]ociologists have explained that the racial or
gendered character of taken-for-granted institutionalized practices is
often rendered invisible to current incumbents of organizational posi222
tions.” Those workplaces interested in enhancing diversity might re223
structure such invisible barriers to workplace integration.
221 See Ayres and Siegelman, 74 Tex L Rev at 1491–93 (cited in note 176) (discussing how
the rise of disparate impact liability induced employers to shift from objective tests to less transparent subjective evaluation metrics in order to eliminate individuals from disfavored groups).
222 Green, 72 Fordham L Rev at 670 (cited in note 197).
223 Yet just as litigation strategies have limits, so too do education strategies. For example,
following the guidance of human resource departments and lawyers, many companies have
adopted harassment and diversity training programs to avoid litigation. As Professor BisomRapp notes, however, very little evidence supports the effectiveness of sexual harassment training. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of
Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U Ark Little Rock L Rev 147,
162–65 (2001); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 1, 4–5 (2001).
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While such guidelines often receive little deference from courts,
they may still influence intentional but risk-averse passive discriminators.
If they send a signal of possible liability, even if a very speculative signal, employers and human resource managers take notice. As sociologist Lauren Edelman has documented, many employers adopt practices based on management consultants’ claims that the recommended
practices would render organizations free from legal liability, even
225
when such claims are not rooted in any established case law. In turn,
some evidence suggests that courts will incorporate these organizational efforts into legal standards for compliance, thus creating a syn226
ergistic feedback loop. So EEOC attention and guidelines might
create a reinforcing regime to combat passive discrimination.
227
Employers, or other actors in the workplace, might also be encouraged to combat firm segregation and discrimination more broadly.
Existing organizational efforts to promote diversity include “implementation of organizational accountability by creating new positions
or taskforces designed specifically to address diversity issues, mana228
gerial bias training, and mentoring and network practices.” Such
processes could be expanded to include concern for how the existing
organizational structure may not satisfy minority employee preferences even if it does not formally exclude them. Some empirical evidence suggests programs designed to increase minority recruitment
229
and employment have been successful, so reason exists to be hopeful
about expanding the focus of these programs.
224 Courts have not resolved the level of deference due the EEOC but often decide cases
contrary to EEOC guidelines. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court
and the EEOC, 74 Fordham L Rev 1937, 1949–61 (2006).
225 Lauren B. Edelman, Overlapping Fields and Constructed Legalities: The Endogeneity of
Law, in Justin O’Brien, ed, Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Dynamics of Capital
Market Regulation 55, 70 (Imperial College 2007) (suggesting that lawyers and management
consultants “emphasise and even exaggerate the threatening aspects of legal environments” in
order to shield businesses from possible liability).
226 See Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 105 Am J Sociology at 408 (cited in note 182).
227 Those employee institutions engaged in collective action, such as unions, might themselves be made aware of these problems and be encouraged to bargain over these particular terms
and conditions of employment. In order for this strategy to work, these bargaining units need to be
effective representatives of those individuals with protected characteristics. That being said, if
passive discrimination keeps these individuals from disfavored groups out of particular workplaces,
then organization of existing employees may be unlikely to focus on these issues.
228 Pager and Shepherd, 34 Ann Rev Sociology at 195 (cited in note 43). As evidence indicates that poorly designed programs can create new or reinforce old stereotypes as well as increase hostility between employees, it is important to be mindful of the limitations of diversity
training. See Bisom-Rapp, 22 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L at 38–44 (cited in note 223).
229 See Harry J. Holzer and David Neumark, What Does Affirmative Action Do?, 53 Indus
Labor Rel Rev 240, 269 (2000) (investigating how extensive recruiting, intensive screening, and
on-the-job training contribute to the success of workplace affirmative action policies in hiring
more minorities and women).
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2. Incentivizing employer restructuring.
In addition to mandating changes in employer behavior and educating employers, legislators and the EEOC can also incentivize voluntary changes in employer practices. While the EEOC’s primary
task is to investigate, conciliate, and litigate, the EEOC also possesses
the authority to undertake initiatives to combat employment discrimination. For example, the EEOC recently designed a “freedom to
compete” program, characterized as an “outreach, education, and coalition-building strategy designed to complement the agency’s en230
forcement and litigation programs.” In addition, the EEOC currently
crafts reports outlining what it considers to be best practices to eradi231
cate discrimination. Such tools might also be used to combat these
232
subtle compensation terms-and-conditions issues. The EEOC could
also incentivize creative solutions and reward those companies that
233
develop and embody the gold standard approach.
For most of the problems identified in this Article, figuring out ways
to enhance employee choice should help reduce benefits discrimination
for those with atypical preferences. Ideally, such choice also creates a secondary beneficial effect on workplace segregation by decreasing the
number of members of protected classes who voluntarily opt out of
firms with undesirable packages and structures. Such organizational
adjustment may contribute to long-term stability by increasing the fair234
ness of compensation and other terms and conditions of employment.
While federal tax law encourages employers to give all workers with
the same experience the same fringe benefits package, employers can still

230 EEOC, Facts about the Freedom to Compete Initiative, online at http://www.eeoc.gov/
initiatives/compete/index.html (visited Apr 14, 2009).
231 See, for example, EEOC, Interim Report on Best Practices for the Employment of People
with Disabilities in State Government (Oct 29, 2004), online at http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/
nfi/int_states_best_practices_report.html (visited Apr 14, 2009) (finding that a number of states
have established hiring and training programs specifically for individuals with disabilities and
that adequate procedures exist to handle requests for reasonable accommodations).
232 David Charny and G. Mitu Gulati have suggested the EEOC provide rewards to workplaces
that study and restructure their workplaces to eradicate bias in subjective decisionmaking and

the effects of certain groups choosing self-defeating strategies. Such a program should be legally
viable (race- or gender-neutral) as long as it is framed in terms of ensuring an equal opportunity
workplace; incentives for adopting such programs could come from both economic advantages
and from the pressures exerted by a reconstructed employment discrimination doctrine.
David Charny and G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of
Employment Discrimination Law for “High-level” Jobs, 33 Harv CR–CL L Rev 57, 105 (1998).
233 Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 BC L
Rev 367, 404 (2008) (discussing diversity programs that have purposes and effects beyond reducing and ending litigation).
234 See Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, 27 Am Behavioral Scientist
371, 382 (1984).
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maximize their tax benefits and allow employee choice within packages.
For example, the federal government currently offers its employees the
235
choice of multiple health plans rather than limiting them to one, as is
often the case in the private sector. Such choice allows employees to
236
select a package that best matches their expectations and preferences.
One can imagine similar options for pension benefits in which employees
could elect how much pay to take directly as wages and how much to
237
backload through pension benefits. Rather than the status quo in
which employers often automatically enroll employees through defined
benefit plans, the EEOC could encourage employers to allow workers
to decide whether and how much to invest in defined contribution
238
plans. Employers could allow employees to decide how to distribute
their matching contributions, which could include benefits such as
health insurance.
Analogous compensation menus might be offered for positions
that currently rely on commission sales. The EEOC could encourage
employers to offer a variety of wage packages in sales jobs that allow
individuals to assess their desired level of risk-taking in determining the
composition of their salaries. While the businesses may seek to incentiv239
ize sales through a commission, creative employers might find non235

See Cynthia Dailard, State Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Creative Responses to Questions of Conscience, 2 Guttmacher Rep Pub Policy 4, 1 (1999), online at http://www.guttmacher.
org/pubs/tgr/02/4/gr020401.pdf (visited Apr 14, 2009) (noting the 285 plans available in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program). In practice, however, employees are often limited by
geography to a few choices. See Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan Information for 2008,
online at http://www.opm.gov/insure/08/planinfo.asp (visited Apr 14, 2009) (providing information on the plans available in each of the fifty states).
236 In order for such choice to work, insurance packages need to be more transparent. See
Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 Wash L Rev 363, 386 n 132
(1998) (detailing the difficulties employers and employees face in ascertaining what medical
services are covered by their health insurance providers). Both employers and employees need
to be able to easily ascertain whether such packages cover services and prescriptions most likely
to be utilized by protected classes such as prescription contraceptives or sickle cell–related procedures. Perhaps EEOC training of human resources and benefits personnel could help firms
achieve this transparency.
237 This may create problems for other protected groups. While African-Americans may
rationally opt out of pension benefits, Hispanics, who traditionally have longer life expectancies,
are the most likely to opt out of pensions. See Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61
Wash & Lee L Rev 1501, 1530 (2004) (analyzing the racial differences between workers who
receive pension benefits, and finding that whites are the most likely to be covered by pensions,
while Hispanics are the least likely to be covered).
238 See GAO, Pension Plans: Characteristics of Persons in the Labor Force without Pension
Coverage 7 n 6 (Aug 2000), online at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00131.pdf (visited Apr
14, 2009) (“While defined benefit plans generally enroll qualified employees automatically,
defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, are generally voluntary and employees must
choose to participate in them.”).
239 For purposes of the model and the hypotheticals, we assume that all workers are equally
productive regardless of compensation offered. If commission-based sales actually track produc-
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compensation measures to encourage the same high level of sales. For
instance, Sears adjusted the level of salary dependent on commission
240
when it decided it wanted to attract more female employees. Rather
than eliminate commission-based jobs or offer all employees the same
commission, Sears could have provided multiple options.
Employee choice could also address the problems raised by “Sundays off” policies. If Chick-fil-A is serious about its desire to provide “a
241
day off to spend with family and friends,” then perhaps franchisees or
employees should have some discretion over which day that will be.
While religious employees of non-Sunday faiths can already seek accommodation under Title VII, Sundays need not be the default day off
for all employees if Chick-fil-A does not seek to send a religious message.
242
Of course, employee choice raises several concerns. First, for
employee choice to work, such choices must be perceived as valid
choices. Successfully providing a menu requires that employers not
stigmatize some of the options—as some suggest has happened under
243
so-called “mommy tracks.” Such practices might be less likely as
tivity, then the question of whether employers should be encouraged to abandon the practice is
outside the scope of this Article. At least some evidence, though, suggests preference for salarybased risk is unrelated to productivity or skill. See note 68.
240 See note 70.
241 Chick-fil-A, Frequently Asked Questions, online at http://www.chick-fil-a.com/Work.asp
(visited Apr 14, 2009).
242 The three authors disagree about the viability of such an approach. One major concern
is the possibility that employees may choose poorly in attempting to satisfy their preferences. For
instance, most workers elect not to participate in their pension plans, which might make sense for
some black workers but makes little sense for Hispanics, who have the highest life expectancy.
See Dorothy A. Brown, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1521 (cited in note 237). If we are right about
the effectiveness of screening mechanisms, many individuals already have an accurate sense of
their preferences, which should, but may not, align with their actual needs.
A very different approach would be to decrease employers’ incentives to provide fringe
benefits. As the tax code is currently structured, it encourages employers to provide compensation in the form of fringe benefits. Neither they nor the employee pays taxes on such benefits,
though the employees would pay taxes if they procured such services on the open market. If
reducing either workplace segregation or equalizing the perceived value of compensation received is the primary goal, the government could stop subsidizing these benefits. Yet such an
outcome seems unpalatable. As explained earlier in the Article, it lowers the economic value of
compensation to Deltas without a corresponding rise in economic value to Omegas. If all we care
about is equality in perceived compensation or decreasing workplace segregation, then this is
unobjectionable. But one of the currently extolled virtues of employers is that they choose to
provide these services particularly when they get a good deal for employees.
One could then further combine an elimination of the tax incentives with government provision of many of these services. The government could provide greater amounts of health care
and social services to alleviate the burden on the employer. Even then, though, employers could
try to offer greater benefits to achieve the same sorting function. A truly socialized system might
eliminate this possibility, but, of course, the costs and benefits of such an approach raise a much
larger debate than can be adequately addressed in this Article.
243 See, for example, Amy L. Wax, Family-friendly Workplace Reform: Prospects for Change,
596 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 36, 37 (2004) (observing how mommy tracks have devalued
employees who choose fewer hours); Joan Williams, Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gend-
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most of the forms of passive discrimination we identify would not involve the employee opting into less hours for less pay but into the
same hours for differently structured pay.
Second, facilitating choice poses significant administrative costs for
small and sometimes even large employers. Rather than providing one
benefits package and one compensation structure, benefits and payroll
personnel and structures must accommodate a variety of options. As
increasing numbers of employers seek to provide choice with attention
to previously unnoticed discrimination, health and pension benefit market niches may develop. Even then, many, though not all, fringe benefits
rely on pooling. For instance, in order for employers to get good deals on
group health and life insurance, insurance providers often require that
they put all the employees on the same group policy. Otherwise, if those
who believe themselves least likely to draw on the insurance opt out, insurance companies are unlikely to offer employers the same discounts.
CONCLUSION
By naming, describing, and modeling a rarely discussed mechanism
of employment discrimination, this Article adds to the literature on subtle forms of discrimination and the causes of workplace segregation. By
way of example, we examine the employment law context to show that
legislators and courts failed to draft and interpret Title VII with such
problems in mind. Both intentional and unintentional passive discrimination can lead to segregated workplaces, but as currently conceived, doctrinal and practical problems may foreclose Title VII as an effective deterrent or remedy. As a first step, we note a number of changes that might
be made to Title VII or to legislation more generally to address particular
mechanisms of passive discrimination in terms and conditions of employment. As scholars across disciplines have noted, reformers may need
to conceptualize major changes in order to address these problems of
segregation and structural discrimination. These problems, which we hypothesize in perfectly competitive markets with idealized workers, may
be exacerbated if we relax some of the assumptions of our model, such as
the notion of equally productive workers. While we introduce passive
discrimination in the context of race, sex, national origin, and religion, we
hope to pursue future scholarship to address how the deployment of such
er, 49 Am U L Rev 987, 995 (2000) (arguing that the work of employees in flex-time and parttime positions are generally marginalized relative to the work of other employees). But see Mary
Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie?: A Few Troubling Questions about Where, Why, and How
the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 Chi-Kent L Rev 1753, 1768 (2001) (suggesting employers are successfully choosing to reduce the stigma of so-called mommy tracks and
recasting them as “life outside of work” options), quoting Sue Schellenbarger, Work & Family:
Shedding Light on Women’s Records Dispels Stereotypes, Wall St J B1 (Dec 20, 1995).
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mechanisms affect other categories including family status, sexual orientation, and disability.

